The War of the Cutover

In rural terms, a cutover is a patch of land with all of its timber cut off, normally to be replanted in white pine, but not always. Sometimes it leaves a barren wasteland of stumps, scrub trees and underbrush that’s the forest’s own way of healing itself. A lot of briars, venomous vegetation and all sorts of things to obscure our line of sight. For those who know, once you cross this barrier on the edge of a forest the woods seem to ‘open up’.
Throughout the rural southeast you’ll find these cutovers nearly everywhere- patchwork is sometimes the name given to it- of relatively small squares of land that are, aside from the waist-high underbrush, open terrain.
“It ought to be noted by those who maintain dogmatically that the struggle of the masses is centered in city movements, entirely forgetting the immense participation of the country people in the life of all the underdeveloped parts of America.” -Che Guevara
It has been asked, to the point of madness, how a conflict will manifest in the United States. Many, among the wholly ignorant to the realities of both war and the social conditions therein, cannot make sense of the issues before them. While the conflict in the cities will rapidly develop and serve as a shock factor for many, eventually, as we have seen in countless examples from Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, the lines will bog down to a stalemate. Eventually the oppressor state-backed security forces will re-establish order simply based on numbers alone, be it volunteers or conscripts. Nearly nothing can be expected to be achieved in the meat grinder of urban warfare absent a successful guerrilla campaign to secure and outmaneuver security or occupation forces in a rural area. Absent the popular support for such, it is wholly a futile effort.
Knowing this, an occupation’s focus will be on those same rural areas. Security forces can absorb and overcome a certain degree of losses whereas a guerrilla band cannot. Those same forces cannot, however, overcome a lack of morale created by the same lack of popular support. They can only hope to repress their way to compliance, which only offsets the conditions of revolution for a time. Such was the case in Ireland and Chechnya. From the perspective of the guerrilla, the ability to strike without warning, relying on mobility and local support must be the primary strategy.
The focus then becomes on the War of the Cutover. One of the fundamental truths of combat is that an adversary cannot shoot what they cannot see. This works both ways. Light Infantry troops are taught to avoid open areas as they are death traps from all directions. There is no cover nor concealment, and it also must be understood that the battlefield is in three dimensions. As MAJ H. John Poole keenly notes in both Phantom Soldier and The Tiger’s Way, the eastern methods of warfare, utilizing stealth and deception to multiply the small numbers of manpower, have always accounted for this principle, continuously outmaneuvering their western adversaries in the ‘counterinsurgencies’ where they’ve fought.
Both the guerrilla and occupation force must take into account this terrain feature. For the occupation force, the cutover serves a couple of functions- landing zones for rotary wing assets in flat terrain and lager points for mechanized assets. In both cases, they become rally points or casualty collection points, staging for infil and exfil operations. Knowing this, this should be the primary area for which a guerrilla plans attacks.
Cutover areas are normally not large in terms of macro-terrain features (hill, valley, saddle, ridge, depression) normally only a couple of hundred meters across on average. This is perfect terrain for a small team of trained marksmen to pin down a much larger force when they’re likely most vulnerable. There are two primary weaknesses of an occupation force in this terrain:

  1. They are exposed with little cover or concealment.
  2. Their force multipliers (close air support and indirect fire) are now at least within Danger Close range, if not unavailable. The use of such nearly insures fratricide, severely sapping morale.

A successful ambush in these areas requires prior knowledge of these particular zones. The guerrilla band must map them out, memorize them, and this plays to the reality that a successful guerrilla band must be of the area in which they operate. Their presence and dialect matches that of the rest of the populace. It is them versus the occupation at an innate level. Further, understanding how to use this terrain to its maximum effect afford the guerrilla a critical victory on many levels. Sapping the occupier’s morale on the ground and coupled with exploitation of such (a photo is worth a thousand words), as well as the conservation of ammunition with limited numbers of exposed fighters, ensures a long term victory.
From the occupier’s standpoint, with mounting casualties and an inability to maintain order among troops due to low morale, eventually they will abandon fighting in these areas and focus on more successful operations in repressing the local population, creating road checkpoints and cursory searches to harass the locals and isolate them from the guerrilla force. If Iraq and Afghanistan can be used as a guide, and I contend they are the perfect guides for mistakes on part of an occupation, this only causes the population to increasingly favor the guerrilla.
It is this terrain, limited to rural vegetated areas, where the critical victories at both the tactical and psychological level must be achieved. Destroying occupier morale and limiting their strategy to one of isolating the populace, a guerrilla force can build their ability to project force in larger numbers, enabling larger scale strikes and the insurgency grows. But absent the understanding of this terrain, and its favorable potential, a guerrilla will find himself at the mercy of all of tools that same occupation bears against him.
Be the Hunter, not the Hunted.
 
 
 

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By Published On: January 17, 2021Categories: NC Scout, Tactical23 Comments on The War of the Cutover

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About the Author: NC Scout

NC Scout is the nom de guerre of a former Infantry Scout and Sergeant in one of the Army’s best Reconnaissance Units. He has combat tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He teaches a series of courses focusing on small unit skills rarely if ever taught anywhere else in the prepping and survival field, including his RTO Course which focuses on small unit communications. In his free time he is an avid hunter, bushcrafter, writer, long range shooter, prepper, amateur radio operator and Libertarian activist. He can be contacted at [email protected] or via his blog at brushbeater.wordpress.com .

23 Comments

  1. Anonymous January 17, 2021 at 12:22

    5

  2. Recon Prepper January 17, 2021 at 14:06

    our neighbor did this a few years back and now has an impenatrable mass of briars taking over. Scrub oak no higher than 10 feet high is covered in briar vines. Its definitely not a friendly place to have to hike thru LOL. At least it keeps the average person from coming thru that direction. If someone was really desperate they might try and hike thru it but I doubt it.

    • wwes January 17, 2021 at 14:50

      That’s precisely what makes an area like that perfect for concealment. It provides a great means of concealment, and most would never fight the briars to look for someone.
      I grew up playing in areas like that, and they were great for playing hide and seek, or hiding from my parents.(my parent’s never would find me, but it would have gone better for me if I had come out when they told me to)

  3. vyt1az January 17, 2021 at 14:39

    Be the hunter, not the hunted. This kind of terrain is perfect for hunting deer. Also sounds exactly like every interview I’ve heard from Vietnam vets.
    Question about the following quote:
    “Their presence and dialect matches that of the rest of the populace. It is them versus the occupation at an innate level.”
    The disadvantages of not having a populace like this are apparent to me, but are there any benefits to not having it?
    Specifically, I’ve got a solid group of folks, in a mostly rural area. We, like the greater populace, have a ton of other transplants mixed with natives. So there’s no common dialect. Common ideology but not a common cultural background.
    Could there be an advantage in that there isn’t an easily identifiable “dialect?”

    • NC Scout January 17, 2021 at 15:08

      There might be, but as social psychology of a local populace suggests, its easier to identify with people who wound like you.
      That said, its not a HUGE deal, but is one to consider. Its also the reason we take on the accent of a place the longer we stay in an area. Its a psychological defensive mechanism.

  4. Coop Willis January 17, 2021 at 20:25

    Thanks for this great info. In Montana we call them Clear Cuts. Lot of country with dominant pine forests leading right up to the edge of town in places.

  5. Johnny Paratrooper January 17, 2021 at 20:32

    In PA there are thousands and thousands of unmapped, forgotten, and unknown mines.
    In MD there are thousands and thousands of miles of reed shoreline and double canopy.
    In Ohio there are an unfathomable number of creeks and woods so thick you can barely maneuver.
    In West Virginia there are thousands and thousands of micro mountains. The micro terrain in Western Virginia is unforgiving.
    In Wyoming once you cross the first mountain range you see, you are in God’s land.

    • Rob Witte January 18, 2021 at 11:41

      I’ve always referred to much of West Virginia as the “American Afghanistan”.
      Honestly, more patriots should consider owning land there. Arable soil, mountainous terrains, creek aplenty, grazing land, etc and so forth.

      • Yankee January 18, 2021 at 18:45

        But why would they want us there? We would be nothing but a bunch of foreigners to them, bringing in foreign money and foreign culture. I myself am from the north east, and it wouldn’t matter that I’ve never been liberal, always hunted, and grew up in the woods. To them, I would always be some yankee carpetbagger, and I couldn’t really blame them for thinking that. I’d rather fix the issues in my neck of the woods where I understand how the locals think.

        • Scruff September 9, 2021 at 12:33

          for 3 generations up here in Maine we’ve watched the dilution over time due to people from away move up here. I and many others have watched our way of life change. As you noted, moving away from it is very tempting, but my concern is than I’m doing the same thing that they did. Add to that if ‘we’ all show up in the same place, nuking from orbit means game over. I’ll stay here and fight for my rights.

    • SemperFi, 0321 January 18, 2021 at 21:58

      JP,
      you can hike south down the S Fk and I’ll hike north, we’ll meet in the middle one day. God’s country for sure.
      You take care of yourself until then.

  6. MIchael Gladius January 18, 2021 at 00:13

    Two thoughts:
    1. The Eastern Way of War relies heavily on numbers, and lacks shock power. Deception and camouflage is good for reducing casualties taken while marching or fighting, but it does not amplify offensive capabilities. There is a reason in the Vietnam War the North Vietnamese lost 1.1 million men while America lost fewer than died at the Battle of Gettysburg. Poole is not the only one to overlook this crucial point, but we should not.
    2. The state can create cutovers and wage scorched-earth tactics, particularly when production is highly concentrated. Guerrilla tactics would not have worked in defeating the Red Army in the Russian Civil War because outside of the few cities controlled by the Bolsheviks, there was no production beyond agriculture. An occupying force can starve guerrillas to death, especially if they don’t care about “hearts and minds” and/or if the guerrillas have no external support (which most leftist guerrillas had).

    • NC Scout January 18, 2021 at 09:45

      To your points:
      1. Were this assertion correct, it can neither account for the limited numbers of fighters in both those examples mentioned (Ireland and Chechnya). Ireland, in particular, had less than 100 fighters at any given time. Poole did not overlook this, he spoke from experience. To mention the NVA is problematic at best- they fought a conventional war in the DMZ akin to the DPRK, which they were ill-prepared for and even when they made successful inroads, it had more to do with tactical errors on our part. The second note on this is one of an oxymoron- if a guerrilla force has the numbers, they can indeed create shock. If they don’t, they can’t. Deception, 100% of the time, amplifies offensive capabilities.
      2. The scorched earth tactic was implied but not stated. This is not an academic piece but one to be used. The Russian revolution had more dynamics than popular urban support, and should you read Kropotkin’s “Conquest of Bread”, you’d know this. The popular support already existed in the rural areas due in large part to the opulence of the ruling class. It is a forgone conclusion that an occupying army cares little for ‘hearts and minds’ and is a point that should be reinforced among guerrillas.
      Every attrocity, every implied slight, every insult no matter how minor (‘fly over country’) should be reinforced to galvanize popular support.

      • MIchael Gladius January 18, 2021 at 11:57

        The Chechens had the advantage of dealing with a post-Soviet military, whereas the Putin-era military was far more effective. In 2006, the Russians simply flattened Grozny, rather than playing 3rd-generation blitzkrieg. Massed Russian artillery and minefields landed crippling blows to the Chechens (particularly killing their leaders) and made it impossible to fight conventionally. Today, they are not the winners by any stretch. Merely surviving is not the same as winning.
        The Irish are also problematic- they did not actually win any of their attempted revolutions. Battles yes, wars no. The Irish became independent through treaties that originated from the home rule movement, and the thousands of veterans from WWI (not to mention the best IRA leaders like Michael Collins) threw their support behind the diplomatic solution which made Ireland a dominion in 1922 and then fully independent in 1948. The war of 1919-1921 merely resulted in a stalemate which the post-WWI British government wasn’t interested in fighting (similar to Russia in the 90s). We cannot afford to assume that a future guerrilla war will be fought against a weak government open to compromise- the Maoists will certainly not be inclined to the latter.
        The NVA was far more successful than either of these because they were equally as capable of using guerrilla tactics, and had far more firepower. Deception doesn’t kill enemies or blow up vehicles, firepower does. The NVA is also worth mentioning because they were modeled after Maoist doctrine, and fought very similarly to the Iranians in the 1980 war with Iraq (both Iran and China are quintessential Asiatic powers). The NVA’s performance fluctuations also correlate to the strength of the opposing government (i.e., South Vietnam), thus showing the link between guerrilla effectiveness and government strength. The NVA’s Viet Cong allies/auxiliaries also were responsible for thousands of assassinations, which was Michael Collins’ greatest blow to the British government. Finally, the US military used cutouts in the Iron Triangle to great effect, and collapsed many tunnel systems with B-52 bombings. We will not have the luxury of the communists’ untouchable Laotian/Cambodian sanctuaries, and will more closely resemble the ARVN, which fought most of the war equipped with M1 carbines and minimal crew-served weapons (the firepower difference between US and ARVN battalions was somewhere near 16:1).
        Even if the peasants in the Russian countryside had been wholly anti-communist, they had zero means for resisting. They would have had no guns, no ammunition, no machine tooling, and no chemical sources for powder. The White Armies had no external support, and the warlords in the south stood little chance of withstanding the Red Army beyond one or two big battles. The same happened in the Chinese Civil War- the ChiComs were on the back foot until the Soviets defeated the Japanese in Manchuria and gave the surrendered arms to the Chinese Red Army. Even then, it still took George Marshall’s intervention to ensure the National Revolutionary Army (Chaing’s army) did not receive any of the promised American aid while the Red Army was trained by the Soviets and consolidated their rule over the northern provinces. Without all of this external intervention, the Chinese Reds would have lost decisively- we will not have any of this.
        The importance of the cutover is a strategic one- the Reds can use cutovers as a form of area denial, and the right needs strategy to counter such methods. Guerrilla warfare will not win on its own, but is best used in combination with conventional victories.

        • NC Scout January 18, 2021 at 12:15

          “The Chechens had the advantage of dealing with a post-Soviet military, whereas the Putin-era military was far more effective. In 2006, the Russians simply flattened Grozny, rather than playing 3rd-generation blitzkrieg.”
          They did this in the first war as well. In fact, the entire first war was a combined arms maneuver. It worked neither time. What did work was isolating the outside elements (The IIB led by Ibn al Khattab) from the general populace. This alone created peace, and it was not wholly so. It remains uneasy.
          “The Irish are also problematic- they did not actually win any of their attempted revolutions. Battles yes, wars no. The Irish became independent through treaties that originated from the home rule movement, and the thousands of veterans from WWI (not to mention the best IRA leaders like Michael Collins) threw their support behind the diplomatic solution which made Ireland a dominion in 1922 and then fully independent in 1948.”
          All wars end in negotiated settlements. To suggest the IRA was unsuccessful is idiotic.
          The NVA was a conventional, standing army. Period. And literally nothing else you have said refutes any of my points. So now that you’re done suggesting defeat, let’s focus instead on victory.

  7. Ned2 January 18, 2021 at 21:22

    Good discussion, but you are all stuck in ancient warfare games.
    Today, much more will be accomplished electronically. We’ll hack their systems and neuter them that way, up to and including their banking, logistics and supply systems.
    US (and foreign) forces are impotent without electronics.

    • NC Scout January 18, 2021 at 22:03

      And how exactly are you gonna pull that off? AQ couldn’t do it (they tried).
      Until some quit hanging out in la-la land, you’re going to continue to accomplish squat.
      Don’t worry, I’m out training the serious.

    • Ned2 January 18, 2021 at 22:12

      The future of us depends on our ability to fight using means that are several steps ahead of the enemy.
      Forget insurgent/Rambo tactics. You’ll be quickly exterminated.
      We can hack their systems. They have thousands of people maintaining these systems, because they’re hackable. What does that tell you? They’re very vulnerable.
      Imagine multiple scenarios:
      -redirecting drone strikes on their own.
      -manipulating media narratives.
      -shutting down fuel delivery systems.
      -manipulating radar readings.
      -manipulating communications/orders.
      The list is endless.
      And all this could be accomplished by a few teenagers in a basement somewhere. Remotely, from anywhere on the planet.
      They’re already doing it to us.

      • NC Scout January 19, 2021 at 07:16

        Again, how are you gonna accomplish this?
        Quit with the bullshit.
        What you are mentioning here are enablers, but not substitutes for direct action. And it’s crystal clear you have zero idea what you’re talking about.

        • Apex Predator January 19, 2021 at 18:29

          I often wonder if these guys aren’t sent out to places like this on purpose as disinformation agents, sort of the ‘Q-Anon Squad’ if you will. With the simple job of misdirecting and/or stifling actual useful info so that the masses don’t get uppity.
          The very first line of his post screams that he literally knows fuck-all about how electronic warfare works. Teenagers in the basement are going to co-opt drones? Those are closed loop systems that even the Chi-Coms with unlimited talent and funds would have extraordinary difficulty co-opting. There are so many failsafes in place on top of equipment like that precisely to prevent such an occurrence it’s absurd to suggest it. The rest of the list is equally fabulous but that one especially caught my attention.
          Want to prevent drone strikes? Neutralize the operator’s family at their home while he is in the trailer on his 12 hour shift. Then he will reconsider the error of his ways. Want to disable communications? Why hack the signal when you can hit the vulnerable network switching equipment at the BASE of the cell phone mast? I could go on but then I’d look like I actually know something and revealing your ‘power levels’ today is not a wise thing to do.
          tl:dr- I wonder if these guys are actually clueless or simply made to look that way by those who very much know what they are doing and why.

          • NC Scout January 19, 2021 at 20:11

            Its a little bit of both, mixed with a healthy dose of boomer delusion. There’s a lot of that.

  8. Garry F. Owen, Trooper January 18, 2021 at 23:59

    We call them clearcuts locally. One such has been part of my favorite hunting area over the past 3 years. Between this past spring and the deer season just ended, the scrub and pines (not replanted) grew to over head height in a single season.
    In such areas, stumps of varying heights, and stringing commo wire across the openings will discourage rotary aircraft.

  9. bluecat57 January 26, 2021 at 09:47

    Even Mother Nature needs the occasional haircut, blowout and styling. (I’m cis-male so that might be repetitive.)
    Mother Nature does all sorts of things to take care of herself. I grew up in Southern California and the first time I heard of El Nino was in the late 80s. It rained HARD for a week and when I finally got out for a walk on Long Beach, the beach was covered with the crap from the toilet Angelinos had made of the Los Angeles Basin which Mother Nature flushed with the El Nino rains.
    It’s not nice to fool Mother Nature. h/t Chiffon Margarine

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