Don Shift Sends: Drone Lessons from Ukraine

Note: the following is an excerpt from my new book Poor Man’s Air Force: A guide to how small drones might be used in domestic unrest or low intensity conflicts. Not just a rhetorical discussion of drone warfare, this book looks at practical usage by the prepared citizen, partisan, and soldier.

Military sUAS began its maturation in Ukraine, beginning as ISR platforms in the 2014 conflict and the following war of attrition. By late 2022, drone warfare had been democratized as it entered its adolescent phase. Videos gone viral show how UAVs have turned the impersonal nature of drone warfare from intelligence and limited high-value strikes into a stalking, relentless hunt of individuals by snipers of the air.

DJI is so common on both sides, that on some battlefields, the appearance of any small quadcopter that may be engaged in reconnaissance is shot down, without verifying if it is friend or foe. While DJI products, intended for commercial photography, worked well for ISR they left much to be desired in attack roles. Other brand drones too small to carry a payload are used for psychological operations to fake Russians into thinking they are about to be attacked by an armed UAV.

Over the year-plus course of the war, armaments have been refined. Small drones drop modified frag grenades; the larger copter drones drop modified anti-armor hand grenades, rifle grenades, or RPG warheads. These are as capable of killing a tank as Javelin missiles as long as the warhead is able to detonate inside the crew compartment and cause a secondary explosion of the ammunition magazine. Russian tanks utilize an autoloader system which means rounds must be stored in the crew compartment, rather than in a separate protected container in the hull.

Accuracy comes from the drone itself coupled with the low altitude the munitions are dropped from. Aim is experience and a bit of timing to calculate the proper lead of a moving target. Multiple munitions allow the pilot to adjust his aim and drop again in the same sortie without having to return to rearm.

Drone attacks come with little to no warning such as the screech of an incoming artillery shell or the increasing throb of a helicopter’s rotor blades. It is frequently said that the Russian troops never knew what hit them, so drone attacks are often mistaken for artillery strikes. The failure, either by carelessness or poor training (perhaps both), to take the UAS threat seriously is markedly evident. Very few, if any precautions such as proper camouflage, air guards, or even aerial awareness (looking up), are practiced.

Given the revelations about the poor training and leadership of Russian troops, combined with conscripted replacements being rushed into combat off the street, the startling lack of caution is quite probably one of inexperience. These soldiers have likely not learned either through indoctrination or experience how to properly camouflage their positions, move while on patrol, and maintain an air guard. Counter-UAS (CUAS) precautions may not even be taught by the Russian Army and if so, the lessons not widespread or applied.

Ignorant, undisciplined troops or civilians will likely react in the same manner, careless to the threat from above and indifferent to its dangers. Even veteran troops may have trouble with the realities of drone warfare, but their experience may give them an instinct to pick up on danger or to better apply learned precautions. Citizen defenders and guerillas with a non-military background will need to have an agile mind to adapt to the drone threat.

Attack video analysis

Video 1

Soldiers are below, not under, cover in a trench/foxhole. They would be out of sight to direct observation from other ground troops and thus below the line of fire. The only way to attack the men, as long as they stayed down, would be indirect fires: grenade launchers, a mortar, or artillery. However, they had zero overhead cover or concealment so the UAV could find them easily and attack directly by dropping a grenade.

Effective overhead camouflage may not have disguised the position, but even with knowing there was a fighting position below, if the pilot was unaware of the presence of soldiers beneath, say camouflage netting, he may not have dropped ordnance. Most UAS passive-countermeasures are about fooling the pilot/sensor operator. One soldier only reacts when he sees the drone release its warhead.

In the second segment, two soldiers are lying prone behind what looks like a small shell crater. They are probably just below the line of fire in a small depression. It’s little low spots like this on a battlefield that have provided safety to countless soldiers since the invention of firearms. However, they cannot hide from a drone above.

The UAV in this case has the ability to perform real time overhead reconnaissance to look for hiding soldiers just like this and instantly attack them when located. The benefit of UAS in this situation versus a helicopter is drones are much quieter, practically going unobserved. In this attack the soldiers don’t even notice, let alone react, to the presence of the drone.

In the third segment, a line of soldiers are moving behind cover, at least in one direction in what may be a natural gully or eroded and overgrown trench. The approach is a textbook use of a terrain feature to move into position safely. Unfortunately, they are being observed by what appears to be possibly two drones. While an observer at ground level may not see them, the drone sees everything. As some men get into position, they are struck by artillery fire that the drone was spotting for.

Video 2

A drone observes troops moving in mostly-leafless trees in a late-autumn forest. Their uniforms are relatively effective, though they are darker than the ground and do contrast, but their movement makes them readily apparent more than the color clash. Had they been motionless against patches of ground that matched their uniform they likely would have been much harder to spot.

In part two, a soldier is lying on his stomach in a foxhole. A grenade drops a few meters to the side, the shrapnel hitting a comrade who does not appear to be sheltered. The soldier in the foxhole is apparently unharmed by the blast, but he has no protection from above. A second grenade is dropped precisely into his foxhole. Amazingly, he is able to get up and run away, but he and another comrade are offed by a drone that drops a grenade directly on one of the soldiers.

Finally, soldiers lounging are easily visible in their uncamouflaged position and mostly plain green uniforms and kit. Two soldiers in a foxhole are dropped on. Of note is their drab green uniforms clashing with the dark brown soil and the tan leaf litter/winter killed vegetation.

Video 3

Soldiers notice the drone and run to hide beneath the trees which are fully leafed enough to offer some obscurity, although the operator can guess their general location. A grenade is dropped, and the blast radius is enough to cover the area where the men are suspected of hiding.  A grenade is dropped on what appears to be a dark green poncho or tarp blowing in the wind. Camouflage needs to be effective, not move unnaturally, and blend in with the terrain.

Video 4