Don Shift Sends: Drone Lessons from Ukraine

Note: the following is an excerpt from my new book Poor Man’s Air Force: A guide to how small drones might be used in domestic unrest or low intensity conflicts. Not just a rhetorical discussion of drone warfare, this book looks at practical usage by the prepared citizen, partisan, and soldier.

Military sUAS began its maturation in Ukraine, beginning as ISR platforms in the 2014 conflict and the following war of attrition. By late 2022, drone warfare had been democratized as it entered its adolescent phase. Videos gone viral show how UAVs have turned the impersonal nature of drone warfare from intelligence and limited high-value strikes into a stalking, relentless hunt of individuals by snipers of the air.

DJI is so common on both sides, that on some battlefields, the appearance of any small quadcopter that may be engaged in reconnaissance is shot down, without verifying if it is friend or foe. While DJI products, intended for commercial photography, worked well for ISR they left much to be desired in attack roles. Other brand drones too small to carry a payload are used for psychological operations to fake Russians into thinking they are about to be attacked by an armed UAV.

Over the year-plus course of the war, armaments have been refined. Small drones drop modified frag grenades; the larger copter drones drop modified anti-armor hand grenades, rifle grenades, or RPG warheads. These are as capable of killing a tank as Javelin missiles as long as the warhead is able to detonate inside the crew compartment and cause a secondary explosion of the ammunition magazine. Russian tanks utilize an autoloader system which means rounds must be stored in the crew compartment, rather than in a separate protected container in the hull.

Accuracy comes from the drone itself coupled with the low altitude the munitions are dropped from. Aim is experience and a bit of timing to calculate the proper lead of a moving target. Multiple munitions allow the pilot to adjust his aim and drop again in the same sortie without having to return to rearm.

Drone attacks come with little to no warning such as the screech of an incoming artillery shell or the increasing throb of a helicopter’s rotor blades. It is frequently said that the Russian troops never knew what hit them, so drone attacks are often mistaken for artillery strikes. The failure, either by carelessness or poor training (perhaps both), to take the UAS threat seriously is markedly evident. Very few, if any precautions such as proper camouflage, air guards, or even aerial awareness (looking up), are practiced.

Given the revelations about the poor training and leadership of Russian troops, combined with conscripted replacements being rushed into combat off the street, the startling lack of caution is quite probably one of inexperience. These soldiers have likely not learned either through indoctrination or experience how to properly camouflage their positions, move while on patrol, and maintain an air guard. Counter-UAS (CUAS) precautions may not even be taught by the Russian Army and if so, the lessons not widespread or applied.

Ignorant, undisciplined troops or civilians will likely react in the same manner, careless to the threat from above and indifferent to its dangers. Even veteran troops may have trouble with the realities of drone warfare, but their experience may give them an instinct to pick up on danger or to better apply learned precautions. Citizen defenders and guerillas with a non-military background will need to have an agile mind to adapt to the drone threat.

Attack video analysis

Video 1

Soldiers are below, not under, cover in a trench/foxhole. They would be out of sight to direct observation from other ground troops and thus below the line of fire. The only way to attack the men, as long as they stayed down, would be indirect fires: grenade launchers, a mortar, or artillery. However, they had zero overhead cover or concealment so the UAV could find them easily and attack directly by dropping a grenade.

Effective overhead camouflage may not have disguised the position, but even with knowing there was a fighting position below, if the pilot was unaware of the presence of soldiers beneath, say camouflage netting, he may not have dropped ordnance. Most UAS passive-countermeasures are about fooling the pilot/sensor operator. One soldier only reacts when he sees the drone release its warhead.

In the second segment, two soldiers are lying prone behind what looks like a small shell crater. They are probably just below the line of fire in a small depression. It’s little low spots like this on a battlefield that have provided safety to countless soldiers since the invention of firearms. However, they cannot hide from a drone above.

The UAV in this case has the ability to perform real time overhead reconnaissance to look for hiding soldiers just like this and instantly attack them when located. The benefit of UAS in this situation versus a helicopter is drones are much quieter, practically going unobserved. In this attack the soldiers don’t even notice, let alone react, to the presence of the drone.

In the third segment, a line of soldiers are moving behind cover, at least in one direction in what may be a natural gully or eroded and overgrown trench. The approach is a textbook use of a terrain feature to move into position safely. Unfortunately, they are being observed by what appears to be possibly two drones. While an observer at ground level may not see them, the drone sees everything. As some men get into position, they are struck by artillery fire that the drone was spotting for.

Video 2

A drone observes troops moving in mostly-leafless trees in a late-autumn forest. Their uniforms are relatively effective, though they are darker than the ground and do contrast, but their movement makes them readily apparent more than the color clash. Had they been motionless against patches of ground that matched their uniform they likely would have been much harder to spot.

In part two, a soldier is lying on his stomach in a foxhole. A grenade drops a few meters to the side, the shrapnel hitting a comrade who does not appear to be sheltered. The soldier in the foxhole is apparently unharmed by the blast, but he has no protection from above. A second grenade is dropped precisely into his foxhole. Amazingly, he is able to get up and run away, but he and another comrade are offed by a drone that drops a grenade directly on one of the soldiers.

Finally, soldiers lounging are easily visible in their uncamouflaged position and mostly plain green uniforms and kit. Two soldiers in a foxhole are dropped on. Of note is their drab green uniforms clashing with the dark brown soil and the tan leaf litter/winter killed vegetation.

Video 3

Soldiers notice the drone and run to hide beneath the trees which are fully leafed enough to offer some obscurity, although the operator can guess their general location. A grenade is dropped, and the blast radius is enough to cover the area where the men are suspected of hiding.  A grenade is dropped on what appears to be a dark green poncho or tarp blowing in the wind. Camouflage needs to be effective, not move unnaturally, and blend in with the terrain.

Video 4

Soldiers enter a “bunker” which is really just a section of trench covered over with a layer of soil on top like a bridge. The covered area is about the size of a bedroom. One of the open sides is partially closed with debris or a tarp. A grenade is dropped where the covering is not complete. That side should have been fully enclosed with sandbags or earth.

Next, a grenade is dropped into what appears to be a vertical shaft of an underground bunker. The hole is easily visible as a dark black spot on the edge of a fallow field. As this was taken in November-December, the trees that formerly covered the hole have now lost their leaves. Not far away, more bunker entrances can be seen. These bunkers are well-built with sandbagging visible. Dead and denuded tree limbs indicate that there was natural camouflage at one point in time, but no longer.

Video 5

The pilot drops on an open trench, no protection let alone concealment from above. In another scene, we see what appears to be an aboveground position or slightly excavated. It is very conspicuous because of the number of tarps and debris around it. Human sign is everywhere and very obviously contrasts with the surroundings. The non-camouflaged black tarps and tires especially stand out. It looks like a pile of garbage in the middle of a winter orchard.

Lessons

Awareness

Situational awareness is the key to staying alive. “Up” has to be considered a threat direction without the forewarning that an approaching manned aircraft gives. Soldiers must get into the habit of constantly looking up and scanning the sky, the same as scanning their sectors at ground level. Incoming drone-delivered munitions offer little to no warning of an attack such as the screech of an incoming artillery shell or the distant report of cannon fire.

In nearly every case, the soldiers move without the slightest hint of awareness that they are being observed. Russian troops exhibited a failure to take the drone threat seriously by neglecting to post air guards, allowing them to be surprised. They have likely not learned either through indoctrination or experience how to properly camouflage their positions, move while on patrol, and maintain an air guard.

Russian soldiers do not appear to be trained to deal with the UAS threat. Discipline and camouflaging seems to be lax to non-existent. CUAS and organized responses do not appear to be something line troops have received any instruction on and no equipment for. Even when they do act intelligently by moving behind cover or in low ground, it is no protection from a UAV with its look-down perspective.

Overhead covered positions

With the UAS menace overhead, static positions of future wars will return to WWI style underground bunkers. The foxholes and bunkers in the videos are well-protected from long-range small arms fire and moderately protected from artillery fire. However, they offer no overhead protection and are poorly camouflaged. There are three factors at work: 1, the position is open to allowing a munition in; 2, the blast protection is inadequate; and 3, the camouflage is inadequate.

Shelters, if discovered, will be subject to recon by fire in the form of precision grenade drops on the openings due to low-cost of the flight and the ordnance. An open excavation allows the grenade to drop right in. Blast-resistant overhead cover is needed for fighting positions and blast deflectors or 90° angles are needed at horizonal entrances. Static positions and excavations need to be well camouflaged against overhead observation.

Open trenches are a thing of the past. They are way too obvious and are easily spotted from the air. Their size makes effective camouflage and blast protection difficult. Fixed fighting positions are equally vulnerable though probably safer than a trench network if the position is small, well concealed, and camouflaged properly.

Vertical openings to the sky are dangerous; horizontal ones to the ground less so, although an explosive detonated just outside the opening can send shrapnel inside. “Bomber” drones are accurate enough, owing mostly to their ability to precisely position themselves, to drop explosives down chimneys. Chimneys must not be open to the sky and if they are, should have some sort of grate to eliminate the possibility of anything being dropped in.

Many soldiers when attacked by a drone use the same self-protection procedures for any explosive attack; they go prone or find cover. This worsens the problem by fixing the target potentially in a point where a grenade blast is magnified, such as a foxhole. By contrast, running seems to have spared more than a few lives. Pilots must chase and re-aim on anyone who runs, so it is easier for them not to follow the runners and instead attack the slow or freezing soldiers.

Camouflage

The main factor in spotting a position seems to be a lack of camouflage. Excavations and human sign (trash, artificial materials) stands out. Shelters need to be dugout for both camouflage (especially in winter) and overhead protection from UCAV-dropped grenades and bombs. Concealment from the aerial perspective appears to be nil.

Airpower in Ukraine also seems to be less than what NATO might bring to bear. Why worry about covering over your fighting position or bunker if the Ukrainian air force has been destroyed? Ten years ago, the Russian soldier might have been fine with this attitude, but not today when drones can get very low and slow to search around in the weeds. HD cameras, low altitude, and deficient camo discipline does not mix.

Vertical camouflage must change to reflect the same attitude as for horizontal camouflage. Positions should not be detectable above an altitude of the treeline (ex. 50 feet/15m). A dark green winter parka might meld with the forest background at several hundred meters over the open sights of an AK-74, but when walking across a brown field of dry grass, a human is a dark, contrasting shape over the lighter backdrop.

Proper camouflage clothing that blends in with the ground from an aerial perspective is needed. Humans think of camouflage in a horizontal sense because that’s how we’ve fought since time immemorial. We want to blend in with the brush, grasses, trees, and rocks as we see them, and humans can’t fly. Camouflage from above, that is blending in with the ground as it looks to someone or something looking down, is new.

Winter deciduous forests are practically transparent to drones. Humans and positions can be easily seen through the bare branches. When winter comes and deciduous trees drop their leaves, concealment and camouflage must be adjusted to compensate for the lack of a tree canopy. Winter is a very vulnerable time to overhead attacks by drones for this reason. A shaded, semi-hidden position in July needs to be moved or improved in October.

Lower signature

Signature management is important. Garbage, tire tracks, and the parts of a shelter below the line-of-sight of the enemy across no-man’s land might not be visible from ground level, but they sure are from the air. Russians don’t seem to clean up their trash well. Litter is highly visible from the air and tends to expand the signature of their perimeter as it is blown or tossed around.

The interior or roofs of shelters are also important. Sure, an enemy a hundred yards away cannot see the walls of your trench or the color and texture of your roof below the parapet, but a drone can. Wattle supporting trench walls shows up well as it contrasts with the earth. A sheet of plywood for a roof is conspicuous in a semi-natural area. If you must use objects like tires in your shelter construction, cover them with dirt or other natural-appearing camouflage. All surfaces need to be camouflaged or at least have neutral contrast to the earth or groundcover beneath them.

Another immediately apparent sign is tracks in a field; large mechanized units will leave a lot of them and in some cases completely tear up grass cover. Tire tracks, tread tracks, and obvious signs of mechanical excavation indicate the presence of men. The age of disturbed ground can be estimated with some accuracy. Machine-made marks in the earth have to be covered with shovels or by marching through it until the highly identifiable vehicular signature is obscured.

Large groups of people in crowds or queues are more visible versus dispersed individuals; do not cluster in the open. Do not stack manmade objects in a natural area where they would be out of place. Convoys and proximity to military vehicles in the open is extremely hazardous as the vehicles are easier to spot. Do not park vehicles near your shelter whenever possible; keep them away at least 100 feet (30m).