Reorient Your Organization: Scenarios Exploring a Quantum Attack on Critical U.S. Power Grid Infrastructure

The Hudson Institute report on “Risking Apocalypse? Quantum Computers and the US Power Grid” highlights the significant threat posed by potential quantum computer attacks on the US power grid. It emphasizes the vulnerability of the grid to such attacks, which could decrypt existing encryption systems and cause catastrophic outcomes. As we navigate the complexities of the quantum era, we used this scenario as a launching point for the formulation of additional scenarios for your strategic consideration, including recommendations and insights for your organization (garnered from the application of both the scenario planning and systems thinking methodologies).  

Risking Apocalypse? Quantum Computers and the US Power Grid

The Economic Damage of a Quantum Attack on America’s Electrical Grid

The Hudson Institute report discusses the substantial economic damage a quantum attack on America’s electrical grid could cause. It suggests that the attack’s impact could be far-reaching, affecting not just the immediate functionality of the power grid but also having prolonged and severe effects on the national economy. The report underscores the necessity of enhancing the grid’s security against such futuristic threats to prevent potentially catastrophic economic consequences​​, such as:

• The Cost of a Quantum Blackout:  The Hudson Institute report’s estimation on the cost of a quantum blackout suggests that the economic repercussions of such an event could be significant. It highlights the need for comprehensive models to understand and quantify these impacts better, underscoring the importance of preemptive measures to protect the power grid and mitigate potential economic damages​​.
• The Economic Impact of Power Disruptions:   The report emphasizes that power disruptions can have severe and widespread economic consequences. It highlights the importance of securing the power grid against potential threats, including quantum attacks, to mitigate these economic impacts and ensure national security​​.

The Quantum Attack Scenario

“Aside from a quantum intrusion, the American power grid is increasingly exposed to traditional cyber threats by adversaries. Such an adversary also having access to a quantum computer or even a quantum-classical hybrid system could secretly gain access to the IT systems controlling the grid’s various power-generation, transmission, and delivery control systems. The hypothetical scenario described below assumed that an adversary with this capability has gained access to the US power grid, which, importantly, has been left exposed to such an attack through the failure to adopt quantum-safe security measures.

In this scenario, the quantum intruder is assumed to have introduced cyber-kinetic malware into the IT system of nine individual high-voltage transformers (HVTs) housed within high-voltage substations across the three principal interconnections within the contiguous forty-eight states. These HVTs are assumed to have simultaneously been taken offline from suffering intermediate physical damage, resulting in cascading power-distribution failures across the contiguous US.

In order to model a maximally destructive disruption event, the scenario is assumed to have unfolded at the hour of peak demand during the month of July 2025, when average electrical usage is at its annual peak nationwide. The resulting power distribution failure is assumed to have caused a total blackout for the contiguous forty-eight states, excluding off-grid backup generation and battery power storage. Due to the nature of the attack and the sensitivity of HVTs, the coast-to-coast blackout is assumed to last seventeen days before significant restoration of the infrastructure brings parts of the grid back online. Although seemingly extreme, this scenario is consistent with the magnitude of the quantum threat and with historical outages, particularly those caused by the cyber-kinetic attacks studied in our research. That the costs incurred from such an attack would be severe is an understatement. In the following sections, we outline the methodology utilized to model such a scenario and then present the results of our analysis.”

The Research Methodology

The research methodology used for this scenario involved a quantitative study designed to model the impact of a hypothetical future quantum cyberattack on the U.S. power grid.

This study utilizes data supplied by the global econometrics firm, Oxford Economics, to assess the potential consequences of such an attack. The approach aims to provide a detailed analysis of the vulnerabilities of the power grid to quantum threats and to evaluate the effectiveness of various protection and mitigation strategies. By focusing on both the security and resilience of the power grid, the methodology seeks to offer policymakers crucial insights into areas requiring immediate attention to safeguard the nation’s critical infrastructure against the emerging threat of quantum computing.

Results of the Scenario

“In total, the economic cost of the hypothetical quantum cyberattack and the resulting seventeen-day total power blackout amount to over $12.8 trillion in damages to the American economy. The direct and indirect costs associated with the attack combined are equivalent to the loss of over 67 percent of 2019’s annual GDP…”

From the report:   “According to our analysis, the cost of a quantum-enabled cyberattack on the US power grid would be daunting:

• In terms of revenue-at-risk, utility companies would lose over $50 billion in revenue from lost electricity sales. This cost would be trivial, however, when compared to the direct GDP-at-risk estimated utilizing the modified production-function VoLL, which exceeded $8.9 trillion in direct costs, i.e., those incurred directly from and during the power outage itself, to the American economy.
• These costs would not be shared evenly by sectors, however; over 75 percent of them would be incurred by the commercial sector, 20 percent by the industrial sector, and roughly half of a percent by the residential sector [with]  a total of roughly $9 trillion in nominal damage.
• Important to note is that the direct costs of the attack presented above are likely to be underestimations due to the theoretical economic assumptions employed and to limitations associated with the data that were available. For example, as detailed above, official government accounts assume that the residential sector, which accounts for over one-third of total electricity consumption in the United States, uses electricity strictly to meet noneconomic needs. Given this and other limitations, the direct costs of such an attack could be reasonably assumed to be significantly higher than those estimated. In addition, there would also almost certainly be significant loss of human life.
• Immediately following the attack, disruptions to supply chains and to business operations and the consequent changes in consumer demand behavior would cause ripple effects throughout the American economy and hence the entire world. As modeled in the Oxford Economics’ Global Economic Model (GEM), these upstream and downstream indirect losses would cost the US economy over $3.8 trillion in real (inflation-adjusted) GDP (nominally over roughly $17 trillion) over the following six quarters.

For the full pdf version of the report, go to:  Risking Apocalypse? Quantum Computers and the US Power Grid

Further Scenarios Exploring a Potential Quantum Attack on the Critical U.S. Power Grid Infrastructure

Exploring potential scenarios for a quantum attack on the U.S. power grid infrastructure requires a blend of technical understanding and strategic foresight.

Given the pivotal role of the power grid in national security and  everyday life, the implications of such an attack are profound and multifaceted.  Additional scenarios include:

The exploitation of encrypted communications within the power grid’s control systems:  Quantum computing, with its ability to break current asymmetric encryption methods, could allow adversaries unprecedented access to sensitive operational data This could lead to manipulation or sabotage of the grid’s operations, from generation to distribution. The strategic decryption of communications could enable attackers to bypass security protocols, manipulate control signals, and disrupt the balance between supply and demand, leading to widespread blackouts or even physical damage to critical infrastructure components.

An adversarial focus on the vulnerabilities within the grid’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems:  These systems, which monitor and control the physical processes within the grid, rely heavily on encrypted communications for secure operation.  A quantum-enabled attacker could potentially decrypt these communications, gaining the ability to issue unauthorized commands, disable safety mechanisms, or inject false data, leading to destabilization of the grid. The complexity and interconnectedness of the grid mean that even localized disruptions could have cascading effects, leading to widespread outages or damage.

The strategic targeting of specific substations or transmission lines could amplify the impact of an attack:  Given the grid’s design to withstand single or certain double failures, a coordinated quantum-enabled attack on multiple critical points could overwhelm the system’s resilience, leading to voltage collapse or cascading failures.  The potential for such an attack underscores the need for a quantum-resilient cybersecurity posture that encompasses both the encryption methods used and the operational strategies for grid management.

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