A short analysis of UAVs in Ukraine
“Is the Ukraine War an RMA?” A very informative discussion about drones/warfare in Ukraine with an expert I follow @RALee85 https://t.co/2ph8q0v0QX
Why 80% of casualties in Ukraine are caused by UAVs
UAVs and artillery as symbiotic means of firepower, or nearly symbiotic. It…
— John Spencer (@SpencerGuard) November 1, 2025
“Is the Ukraine War an RMA?” A very informative discussion about drones/warfare in Ukraine with an expert I follow
chinatalk.media/p/ukraines-dro
Why 80% of casualties in Ukraine are caused by UAVs UAVs and artillery as symbiotic means of firepower, or nearly symbiotic. It would be a mistake to ignore that context. Employing armor is very difficult, and UAVs are the main problem. One of the best night bomber UAV units in Ukraine is the Lasar Group of the National Guard. They have about 90 crews, are extremely well-led, and have a very efficient targeting cycle. According to their internal data, they’ve damaged or destroyed 2,000 tanks and more than 3,000 BMPs or BTRs, and a large number of artillery systems For armored assaults, more than 50% of losses are from FPVs or mines dropped from UAVs. The last time there was an operational surprise was the Kursk offensive. The Kursk operation is interesting for a bunch of reasons, but the operational security was very tight. My understanding is that General Syrskyi led it himself, taking direct command. The brigade commanders had to sign non-disclosure agreements — they weren’t allowed to tell their superior command that they were moving to Kursk. Modern communication technology also complicates the situation. Everyone has a cell phone — you can’t really prevent people from having them, so you have to plan with that in mind. Both sides know their soldiers will call home — both sides have signals intelligence capabilities and listen in on those conversations. Cell phones are used for military communications — probably too often — and this is true on both sides Using UAVs and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) is still a manpower-intensive activity. An FPV team is normally four soldiers, and you have to constantly rotate them out. UGV teams may be larger. When Ukraine conducts an assault, the task organization for a 4-8 man assault group will include an FPV team, a night bomber UAV team, and two Mavic teams in support. That’s four UAV teams supporting a 4-8 man infantry team. The ratio of UAV operators to infantrymen in those cases is 2-to-1 or 3-to-1. Ukraine is looking at creating UAV battalions in all its brigades. They’re forming UGV companies that might become battalions. We’re talking about hundreds of people. The task organization and the table of organization for these units are changing, and it’s going to have to change for our military as well. Autonomy on the battlefield is an iron triangle between capabilities, cost, and survivability.
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About the Author: NC Scout
NC Scout is the nom de guerre of a former Infantry Scout and Sergeant in one of the Army’s best Reconnaissance Units. He has combat tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He teaches a series of courses focusing on small unit skills rarely if ever taught anywhere else in the prepping and survival field, including his RTO Course which focuses on small unit communications. In his free time he is an avid hunter, bushcrafter, writer, long range shooter, prepper, amateur radio operator and Libertarian activist. He can be contacted at [email protected] or via his blog at brushbeater.wordpress.com .
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