Work Around Logistics in a Non-Permissive World, by GuerrillaLogistician

Reference –  17D

By GuerrillaLogistician

@glogistician on X.com

One of the most critically revised historical points I’ve come across is the theory that modern guerrilla warfare was shaped by communist ideology and thought processes. This really isn’t the case, and the reality is that, even though many communist/socialist insurgencies have occurred in recent times, the history of such tactics goes back much further.  I think a quote will point this out best and still give homage to what many of the communists like to present.

[The first war, in which guerrilla forces were used, was fought in China in 360 B.C. , when Emperor Huang was engaged in a protracted conflict with Tsi Yao, the leader of the Miao race. It was Emperor Huang who successfully defeated his adversary by using guerrilla forces. The activities of Francis Marion at the Battle of Cowpens in the American Revolution, were governed by the rules which were later invented by Mao Tse-tung. Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, another writer of Communist military doctrine, introduced nothing to the fund of military knowledge that was not practiced in the Peninsular Campaign  during the Napoleonic Wars, almost a century before.] – Guerrilla Logistics by MARCO J. GARACGIA

The communists definitely had a role in codifying the concepts, rather than doing things without structure. Before the communists codified their techniques into manuals, many of the so-called guerrilla campaigns blended guerrilla warfare and long-range penetration.  One key issue in understanding guerrilla warfare and other unconventional tactics is that many people don’t tend to innovate as much as they should. For instance, Claire Chennault, Founder of the Flying Tigers, was instrumental in pushing back on the Japanese into China before America’s involvement in the war. With limited supplies and capabilities, this man orchestrated tactics to defeat the bombers, tactics that the Japanese later adopted. Yet when he was recalled to the United States, his tactics were shunned because indoctrinated officers with little to no combat experience made decisions without education.

I would venture to guess that many of the people of history, like Francis Marion, would never have been career soldiers if the actual war hadn’t been going on.   Andrew Bustamante’s opinion on the stagnation of innovators in both the CIA and the military in general is probably fairly accurate. To cover his point simply, those people who don’t stand out, can make friends, and toe the party line, tend to have very long careers in the military/CIA.  Innovative people and people who buck the system tend to be kicked out or leave for more lucrative fields. Most likely, some of you are thinking of other soldiers, sailors, and airmen who fit in this category that ruined your life, while others who broke free from this box made history. I know a few Medal of Honor recipients had very shady or contentious careers when war was not going on.

So let’s look at the Chindits and General Wingate during WWII for some insight. We will compare issues and tasks that existed then as they do now, and how they dealt with them. It is to be noted at this time as well that both Gandhi and the Congress of India were none too pleased with both the British and their involvement in the war. So much so that a lot of the strategic assets and requirements for the war in this region were being hindered by terrorist actions; this was not limited to just attacks on the military, but the destruction of railways, the severing of communications, etc.

Some of these issues came from the political party in Congress (anyone see a parallel besides me?)  Add to this, without the Chinese involvement in the war against the Japanese, many of those units could have been maneuvered against the Soviet Union and India quite easily at the time. The Quit Britain movement definitely had some massive drawbacks during World War II, and luckily for history, those consequences weren’t too dire, but could have been. One of the major reasons General Wingate was probably chosen was his previous history dealing with armed revolt in the Palestine region, but also his novel approach to many things.

What does this have to do with logistics in the military and specifically fighting in Non-Permissive Environments, or NPE for short? We should look back at the history of the fighting men, not only because there are many historical books on the subject, but also to see what trials they endured. Using that mindset, we also need to understand how Modern Warfare has changed the battle space while the core principles remain the same. Much like the communists codified guerrilla warfare into a manual, they weren’t creating something from nothing. Soldiers still need to eat, weapons still need to be maintained, and food still needs to be consumed for them to stay alive. The wounded must be cared for, the sick must be tended, and if this isn’t done, your forces will whittle away quicker than a fat American socialist in a job line with no free handouts.

For this article, I want to focus on a group called the Chindits and their long-range penetration. If you do a deeper dive into the subject beyond what I write, you’ll find out that General Wingate had many flaws, including forcing his troops to train in the monsoon season in a jungle and having those sick then become an actual logistical and medical crisis. He also did several things correctly, which were addressing the logistics of a region of jungle and mountains. Everything in China and India is a logistical nightmare, and still, this region is hard to travel in.  8000-foot jungles, malaria, and logistical impossibilities that had to be circumvented by every means possible looked like an impassible roadblock. While some of Wingate’s plans will sound like Modern Warfare tactics in their infancy, others will be lost on us modern war fighters, but commonplace for those involved in World War II.

For instance, the second offensive in 1943 was a long-range penetration raid by a two-battalion strong brigade. This brigade was broken down into seven columns of about 400 men and an additional 100 mules per column. Not to be outdone by mules, the US Air Force got involved as well and became a key to the operation. After its initial long-range attacks into Burma, which did not destroy many troops, it had an interesting effect on both the allies’ morale and the Japanese view of their invincible nature in jungle warfare. At the time, the Japanese were considered among the most capable fighters in jungle warfare, and this was very true.

Some of the key issues the Japanese faced stemmed from that jungle-warfare mindset, but that’s for a whole other topic. The 77th brigade, composed of the 13th King’s Regiment, the 3rd and 2nd Gurkha Rifles, 142 Commando, Signalers, a RAF detachment, and General Wingate’s headquarters, was turned into what is now known as the Chindits. They ended up destroying the main railway line in several places and fought numerous minor battles. They also averaged a marching distance of 1,500 miles behind enemy lines, gaining substantial intelligence.

They also interacted with several tribes in the region positively, which helped them, unlike the guerrilla fighter, who will have to rely on the indigenous population for many of his logistical needs, such as food, shelter, and possibly medical support. The 77th used airdrops to maintain many of the supplies they needed for this long-range expedition.  Both signals and logistics learned vital roles in this deep penetration. For those who have been to the RTO course, you will know that the Japanese were the inventors of the Yagi antenna, which can be used to direction find radio communications. Add to that the NVIS communications techniques needed for mountainous terrain and jungles, and we start seeing why my previous article is so important to this kind of warfare. When you have an overwhelming force of two to one against you, you must think outside the box.

Logistically, Wingate had to not only move supplies, but he had to do it with what was on hand, and the US Army’s trucks and fuel weren’t available.  The terrain alone made vehicles almost not worth it, so other options had to be made. The mule worked very well in these jungle and hilly environments, allowing the fighting force to move with supplies they couldn’t carry on their backs. As I’ve referenced before, fighting load is extremely important, and keeping a soldier light and nimble makes them more capable of fighting a sustained battle. When that battle is between a mobile force behind enemy lines and an enemy twice your strength, every advantage you can figure out is paramount.  In addition, it was noted that many bushcraft techniques were learned during this expedition, further enhancing the soldiers’ ability to fight in adverse conditions.

General Wingate’s tactic was so effective that the enemy took notice and tried to do the same. What the enemy didn’t plan for was that the allied forces held air superiority in that region.  Even though China was vast and the Japanese military faced strategic challenges there, the reality was that Chiang Kai-shek had been threatening to withdraw his forces from the war for some time. The Americans believed the only way to keep him in the war was to open the Burma Road. And create an oil pipeline to supply a bomber force. As stated above, the flying tigers were a huge morale boost; if you listen to the fat electricians’ video on the subject, you’ll see what I mean. Sometimes logistics isn’t just about getting the beans and bullets to people; it is also about morale and how that can affect warfighting.

Air War in Burma and a comparison to modern conflicts.

R-4B eggbeater – https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/195868/sikorsky-r-4b-hoverfly/

Let’s progress to the American side of this contingent and the vital component of the American air commando consisting of 13 Dakota aircraft (C47), 225 wacko gliders, 100 light aircraft (L5), a squadron of 12 medium bombers (B25), A squadron of 30 Mustang-bombers, and six experimental helicopters (R-4).  Not only is the helicopter very interesting, but it was primarily used for reconnaissance because of its slow 65-mile-per-hour cruise speed and 130-mile range.  Without going into massive specs on every aircraft and its capability, here we need to start realizing there is a comparison to this and the current Ukraine conflict. The reason I start with the helicopter is that these were used for reconnaissance, and anyone who’s even woken up in the last 10 years can understand that drone reconnaissance is a constant on the battlefield, so much so that we discussed drones during my pre-COVID scout course.  Now, many of the Opfor and students alike carry both drones and drone detection systems.

Handheld Drone Detection is adjustable for various signals intercept
https://brushbeater.store/products/handheld-detection-system

This guy below has a background in tech and doesn’t like the FLOCK cameras or drone spying, so he has a few products he designed for sale.  I like his equipment and price point; he is not political on his posts.

https://colonelpanic.tech/
ESP32-S3-based BLE detection system with integrated buzzer and power management. This board has some artistic PCB art. Available on Tindie —ready to use, no additional components required.

So we see the use of these drones for scouting, and then along comes the Ukrainian conflict, where drones are being used as bombers to various effects, but every day they get more accurate and more deadly. Much like the evolution of World War I and World War 2, aircraft technology advances rapidly, moving from grenades dropped to add-ons, as the USAF did with JDAM.  A little Finn stabilization and new techniques have turned older direct-fire munitions and hand-thrown weapons into deadly precision-strike weapons, repurposing logistics like never before. Add to this, much of this has been done on 3D printers and other such simple hobby technologies to small industry technologies. With this going on, both nations have also created drones that fly out and attack other drones, knocking them out of the skies with Nets and other innovative techniques, including shotgun-style weaponry. This is all fine and good, but what does this have to do with logistics?

Heavy-lift drones have been in the industry for quite some time and are primarily used for agricultural spraying. The capacities of these drones range from 100 lbs to several hundred pounds. While these cost about the same as a brand-new car in the early 2000s, they are not out of reach for the individual. They are also definitely not beyond the reach of a sympathetic commercial spraying company that might be interested in your cause. These drones have also been used quite heavily in Ukraine, but don’t see as much air time because they are dropping logistical supplies and maneuvering large payloads. It is also said that some of these have been turned into larger bombers carrying far heavier payloads for area effect rather than precision strikes on individuals.

Likewise, the ground units, which many militaries have considered for some time, are available on the civilian market as well. Frankly, I see these probably becoming more of a thing in industrial construction as well. It is fairly easy to load one of these things up and transport supplies and materials to people on a project, far more quickly than it is to have drivers moving small vehicles around at high speeds, because humans love speed. Obviously, the image above is agricultural, but many of these things have been modified to carry patients out of extremely hostile environments without risking soldiers.

 

Also, some drone operators won’t attack a wounded patient in the open on a land drone, although that isn’t always the case.  Either way, these drones have a good pace, can travel on rough terrain, and move everything from food, weapons, and cargo without exposing men in unprotected vehicles.

 

With all that said, the reality is that aerial warfare has changed drastically in the last decade, and even more so from World War II to now, but the key concepts still exist. Moving logistics, attacking enemy reconnaissance, and intercepting enemy aerial assets are all key motivators regardless of the vehicle’s operating design. As you can see above, the Japanese routinely shot at aircraft just like the Americans would do as well, with little more than their machine guns. Nowadays, smaller drone systems require more specialized weapons, such as energy-directed guns, but even so, many of these initial weapons were just remanufactured rounds and shotguns.

 

As technology advances, a lot of this stuff will move into the modern era far faster, but the reality is that, in guerrilla warfare, you may be the one operating the airspace, or the enemy may be controlling it; you still have to address that feature in whatever way possible. It may be from technologies scanning for the threat and you hiding, or it may be something else entirely. We also have to realize that the logistical training of all this is still the same as it was in World War II.

Engineers’ rations and the fighting men who stand on support

One of the major issues I have encountered is finding a balance between the logistics and requirements for survival in combat and the absolute necessity for men to stay alive and fight. While Wingate had plans and tried to employ many of these plans to fight off the Japanese, a lot of things didn’t go as smoothly as he had wished. The initial landing of gliding aircraft caused many issues and even deaths due to their flying in their LZ during night operations. This caused everything from casualties to a lack of personnel to make the initial landing strip for light aircraft to bring in more supplies and troops.

Several of  the gliders missed the mark massively because of an inability to get over the mountains while being towed, and had unintended consequences. These lost gliders caused chaos not only for the allied forces but also for the Japanese. While some units fought allied units, thinking that they stumbled on the Japanese, other groups landed on top of the Japanese. These engagements, while generally fruitless and often ended with capture or death, caused the Japanese to believe they were the main target of the forces, both stalling any reconnaissance and also halting their progress. This gave breathing room for the rest of the follow-on forces to actually make it into the engagement, and fortifications to be set up, along with the supply chain to be flown in.

We sometimes forget that engineers are extremely important to the operation of a good military. From building roads to demolishing bridges, these individuals understand how to build as well as destroy. Most people think of engineers and explosives because that is what the military recruitment loves to portray, and it is probably one of the more interesting and fun aspects of the job. The reality comes down to the fact that these people could probably take crowbars and a bunch of men and destroy a bridge if given enough time with zero explosives. They could also build a rather passable bridge, which may mean survival or the advantage over an unsuspecting enemy.

As you can see in the photo below, they built a walking bridge much like how the Romans did during their campaigns. While bulldozers did exist and were actually flown in by Wingate, these men probably built the bridges with the help of the infantry and many hand tools. Having people who understand critical infrastructure construction and design can be the critical advantage you need with obstacles that look impassible. Do not underestimate engineers/construction workers, or their value.

This also brings me to the other situation that comes along with having men in the field. While we are discussing a more army-centric concept, the reality is that everyone must eat. The best way to make food is by a chef and not just a bunch of guys getting some flour and making their own hard tack biscuits or meaty soup. The average soldier can waste and burn food easily, and the supplies needed to individually cook were a drag on forces in general.  This can be seen, for instance, in the American Civil War, where food logistics shorted both sides regularly forcing the troops to pillage and scrounge more than they needed.

Prepackaged meals are among the most efficient ways to keep someone fed in the field. If done properly and stockpiled properly, you can have that food available for long-duration reconnaissance and other such eventualities. The downside of Wingate’s 1st experiences was food and starvation, and this didn’t change much with this second outing of the Chindits. What did change, however, was the rations they were given.  Nothing beats a hot cooked meal from fresh foods, even if it is just shit on a shingle.  When you are on the move, a good cook and the supplies needed become difficult to both obtain and maintain, so a good ration is the next best thing.  The difference between an MRE you like and one you don’t can be huge for your morale.

One of the original meals made for the British and Indian militaries came with either pork sausage or a soya link(yep, soybean sausage). The men vastly preferred the pork sausage compared to the soya link. So much so that one of Wingate’s subordinates used those as code phrases to express whether everything was going well or poorly; even to this day, people prefer real meat over soy-based products. This unit, however, was starting to receive K rations from the US military, which was apparently a far step above and beyond the British and Indian military rations. So much so that it was a major morale boost to the soldiers and apparently high-calorie enough to keep them fighting until the supplies started to run out. The meals brought in by mule, or airdropped over time, ended up being consumed, and with those K rations gone, things got bad. This is a situation when you have to reduce your logistics capabilities to keep your men alive.

The downside is that a good chef could have extended the use of those mules far further than your average infantry soldier. Still, many people died of starvation during this whole conflict in Burma. If you want to read more in-depth, I think it is an excellent dive into how a man who understood guerrilla warfare and how to combat it expanded his capacity in World War II against the Japanese. There is a whole previous history that can be looked up on Wingate. Unfortunately, it has a lot to do with Jews and fighting against the Palestinians before Israel ever existed, which causes a bit of an issue in researching the truth of things. That probably is a whole different topic that I need to research, and many people believe his operations were extremely heavy-handed, possibly to the detriment of the long-run relations between the Jewish and Palestinian people in the area.

Regardless of the situation at hand, be it a full-blown war, a regional conflict, or just a major disaster where people have lost their minds, logistics in a non-permissive environment will generally have the same kind of flow. Each person must eat, and each task must be done, all the while your logistical train of supplies needs to be cared for as much as the people who run it. You may not have to fight an invading force of Russians or carve through a jungle in Burma to fight the Japanese but all these men have to drink the same thing you do to survive. They must eat food either prepared by themselves or stockpiled by others.

Something that has been true throughout war, though, is that many units have to scrounge for the supplies they require to stay alive, and even though GWOT has the equivalent of the horn of plenty for the average American soldier, this isn’t the norm, but rather the exception. This is why things like area studies and understanding your regional complexities are so crucial to the Guerrilla Logistician, as he acquires supplies for his men. Even if you aren’t the leader of a force, maybe you are just a subordinate of a five-man team that makes sure everything needed gets to the correct person. This role is not unimportant and shouldn’t be left up to the one bean counter with no imagination when it comes to warfare. This might be the dropping grounds of unimaginative and lackluster officers, but that is only a reasonable place for these terrible individuals during peacetime.

What is more spectacular is the fact that these forces that were pitted against the Japanese were both fighting for the logistical superiority of the region. Case in point, Wingate was tasked with cutting off the northern region of Burma and the rail system for the Japanese, while a force that never did actually go in was supposed to attack the ports and cut off that area, strangling the Japanese forces. Meanwhile, the Japanese forces were trying to reinforce their logistical trains and use the same penetration technique against the enemy to further expand territory and control. The more they controlled and divided the logistical aspects of India and the British Empire from the Chinese, the more effective their campaign was against the Chinese. Rarely do soldiers just fight to fight and kill; they often tend to fight for specific objectives that I’ve talked about before.

Anyone who’s taken a scout or recce course will know the acronym SWEAT-MC or SWEAT-IR from my articles.  These tend to be the key aspects that the military is going to attack above all other things because much of this controls the actions and capabilities of the enemy. Why throw your men against other men when you can starve the enemy or cut off the communications to their reinforcements?  Hopefully, this little article makes you think more about logistics in the nature of how war fighting has dynamically changed yet stayed the same. Many preppers have a stockpile of equipment, but never think about how the next resupply is going to occur or where it could possibly come from. Many just hope that a master logistician will come in and give them all the beans and bullets they ever need to fight the fight of the just, but that is never reality.