DRONES Part Two: Drones and the Tactics We Have Seen vs the Doctrine of Air Power, by GuerrillaLogistician

Reference –  D2

By GuerrillaLogistician

@glogistician on X.com

“I hope none of you gentlemen is so foolish as to think that aeroplanes will be usefully employed for reconnaissance from the air. There is only one way for a commander to get information by reconnaissance, and that is by the use of cavalry.”  – General Sir Douglas Haig, British Army 1914

Survivorship Bias

As much as everyone, including me, is speculating, none of us can be 100% accurate in our judgments so far.  We can make some good guesses, follow in the footsteps, use logic, and prior experiences to form our ideas, but like General Haig, past experiences can make a piss poor educator for some. Nothing will allow us to actually go into detail on every tactic until the conflict is over. Many resources on aviation reconnaissance and concealment, such as TM 5-240 Aerial Phototography and TM 5-267 Camouflage, were restricted at the time of publication, so I assume all belligerents in this war are keeping tactics and capabilities secret.  I don’t see this changing for much of the information that will be needed to truly combat drone warfare expertly. This means, just like the combatants, we will be grasping at straws and trying to draw conclusions that may not withstand the onslaught of reality.

With that said, I want you all to realize that this is a best-guess scenario and has been partially tested in a non-life-or-death format. War games and practicing tactics are always a good thing to do, but that doesn’t always mean that you get an accurate representation of what is going on.  This concept, called survivorship bias, was one of the initial issues with equipping aircraft with armor.  If you want to know more, look up Abraham Wald, and I think this should be directly considered when it comes to the number of unfortunate drone videos that have come to light. Most of the drone attacks that are near misses do not get posted online because they don’t look good as propaganda. Hopefully, this will help mitigate some of that survivorship bias, but time will tell.   Now that we’ve established that this is mostly speculation with some testing, let’s dive into the topic itself. How are drones being used? What tactics are they employing, and why do they seem so practical versus previous generations of warfare technology?

Are they Airpower?

“The US Army will never control the ground under the sky if the US Air Force does not control the sky over the ground.” — Col Gene Cirillo, USAF (Ret)

As discussed in the Chindits article, unconventional thoughts are the mainstay of driving towards victory. The Chindits used both air logistics to maintain forces behind enemy lines and as an insertion tactic, which was still pretty novel at the time. That said, one of the key issues in any conflict is understanding the basic principles at stake. Quoted above is Colonel Gene Cirillo, and because he is very correct, this provides a logical basis for why the Ukraine war has dragged on and proved so challenging to resolve. While it would seem that the Russians had air superiority for a while, modern anti-aircraft weapons and drones have brought Russia’s air power to parity.  How Ukraine prevented Russia from total domination with drone warfare is a unique platform that we haven’t seen previously, even with the historical context. If we look at the drone much as we did the submarine, it is not the primary focus of the war, per se, which remains the infantry soldier on the ground.

Both aircraft and drones offer different ways to engage the enemy and attack not only the enemy itself but also its supply lines. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that if the submarine had controlled the seas more effectively during World War I or World War II, history might have changed drastically. What Ukraine and Russia are now doing is fighting in a zone of airspace that is difficult to control and is usually relegated to helicopters or nothing at all. This space is where many anti-air weapons can’t get a good fix on aircraft if the pilot is competent and using terrain features, buildings, and tree cover. While helicopters are still being used in this war in various ways, from transportation to some offensive tactics, the drones’ efficiency, cost, and capabilities per pound outweigh much of the older technology our modern military has relied on. Basically, this has pushed out all the old technology and relegated it to either a supporting role or as a critical strike platform. Much as the cavalry and blimps in World War One were superseded by the capabilities of wooden-winged, fabric-covered airplanes, drones are now superseding much of the technology we install on multi-million-dollar aircraft.  We’re now seeing everything from interceptor drones, bombers, and even SEAD mission-capable drones that hunt both the operator and the drone down.

There is a hodgepodge of quotes that have Ben bandied around claiming that Billy Mitchell and General Spaatz said, “You cannot lose if you control the air, and you cannot win if you don’t control the air.” I’m not sure if anyone specifically made that comment, but I decided to reference the Col above for obvious reasons. We also have General Giulio Douhet, who wrote in 1921 that “he who controls the air controls everything,” so who is to say who made this statement first? Well, I think this is not always a winning strategy nowadays, especially with another quote from Harry Kissinger, “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.”  What we should understand, however, is that now that the cat is out of the bag, the technology is already in the civilians’ hands, and none of this is going away. Guerrilla warfare and partisan warfare will definitely have these systems and already have them in many places.

While limited and not really shown in the US media much, we have seen actual attacks on Israeli forces with drones from the Palestinians. Some are more effective than others, and I believe that has a lot to do with drones being a very overlooked technology before the start of their current conflict. How would the war have gone if the West Bank, instead of firing thousands of rockets into Israel, had strategically flown drones either as bombers or kamikaze into the military infrastructure of Israel?  We probably won’t know until something like this happens again, either to Israel or another nation. What we see is that this tactic of drone warfare has taken most of our industrial weapons production and technology innovators to their knees.

The reality is that this technology is just advancing, as it is now within the common man’s reach. The dynamics seem to have changed, and Modern Warfare technology is making these cheap, efficient drones far more deadly than multi-million-dollar missiles. What exactly are drones exploiting, and how on earth are we supposed to engage in these things? We see in the Ukrainian/Russian war numerous videos of drones flying down trails, striking vehicles, and flying directly into soldiers, then exploding. We watch drones fly over locations and drop grenades onto Unsuspecting infantry. Yet very little was done to prevent either side from doing this, and to this day, we rarely see videos of these drones being countered on a tactical level, let alone a strategic one. How does Air doctrine come into play with this, and what can we learn?

Battle Space Elevation

Red – Fixed wing
Yellow – Helicopter/recon, attack, heavy lift drone
Green – Small kamikaze and small munitions drones

https://x.com/Archer83Able/status/1995835265538294117?s=20
Drone attacking an anti-air unit.

For this conversation, we’re going to split all air assets into three operational areas. While many skilled pilots can fly well below these levels and literally touch the treetops, the reality is that many of these aircraft are designed to operate at specific elevations, as indicated in many manuals. So, we’re going to drop the exception to the rule for the conversation: realize that a helicopter can fly inches above the ground and still potentially fight, but its mobility is severely cut down at this point, much like fighters can fly in the area of space the helicopter usually enjoys.  The red zone is where most anti-aircraft systems are likely to detect anything that isn’t stealthy. The yellow zone is where ground clutter, building tops, and tree tops overlap, confusing radar systems and giving things like helicopters a chance to hide from anti-air assets.

Last but not least is the Green Zone, which I have designated as a friendly, safe green area, but it is also where the drone is most active. This green zone used to be a safer space for helicopters and the like, but that’s no longer the case, so don’t let green mean safe. Think of it as green for go ahead and fly drones. This green zone is where previously air assets could loiter in a hover, or move cautiously and with skill, yet were also vulnerable to waiting ground AA guns if helicopters weren’t cautious enough.  While drones can fly very high at times, most drone operators aren’t going to go much above helicopter level because they’re not needed there. Likewise, drone operations conducted in ground clutter mitigate both sound and the ability to visually see them with both radar technology and the mark one eyeball.

This has become such a threat that both sides have erected large netting to prevent drones from being flown down in these areas. Like helicopters flying between two sections of trees, drones can search roadways and navigate through individual forests with practice, even if it slows them down. While the helicopter has to worry about its occupants being killed, the drone operator can take significant risks without fear of dying in a crash.

Anti-drone netting to protect roads.

Apache training at a very low altitude

This forms a unique battle space that air assets have not really used, one that has to stay basically yellow and above to not only protect themselves from ground fire but also retain the agility and speed that make them so deadly. This means multiple weapon systems have been designed to attack basically from mid-tree level up. The Longbow helicopter was well known to have its radar system at the very top of the aircraft, so it could slightly expose that radar from behind tree lines and get a good fix on ground targets, passing that data to other systems.  Even if the weapon system could detect the radar and fire at the longbow, that aircraft can quickly drop low, preventing missiles and gunfire from raking it and giving it better protection. This tactic is very similar to how submarines operated in wolf packs: keeping their periscopes up for a limited time to gather target data, then firing before diving to relative safety.  Suppose we understand that helicopters use techniques like nap-of-the-earth and contour flight to help prevent them from being spotted or attacked. In that case, it’s no wonder drones have an easier time defeating most modern anti-aircraft weapons.

Helicopter safety and engagement envelopes from AA weapons

Comparison of flight styles; each step down; and slowing the helicopter for safety.

The tactic of having a specialized asset to detect enemies hasn’t been lost on the drone warfare experts, as seen in the video below. Although the video is for propaganda, it shows the attack first, but the end is an overhead view from another drone doing recon.  I suspect the recon drone acquired the target first, and then the attack drone was guided to it.  Finding by recon, Fixing was most likely a shared endeavor, and then the attack drone finished the target, hallmarks of the F3 of F3EAD.  This higher-elevation drone was used much like a reconnaissance aircraft during World War I/II, calling in artillery fire. For those who followed the last article, you’ll realize that these drones can be attacked and have been attacked by other drones. During WWI, the Germans developed a superior aircraft, the Fokker, so the British grouped fighters to protect the reconnaissance aircraft. I suspect this kind of tactic will be used in the future to prevent the destruction of more sophisticated drone systems carrying superior optics, more on par with what the Kiowa had on its mast. Many higher-elevation drones also come with thermal cameras, along with daylight cameras, to help spot enemy combatants. Because most drone operators are in the same room, they can talk to their fellow operators right on the target, as we see.

https://x.com/Sklo_Art/status/1989948099448713350?s=20
An attack on a soldier with a suicide drone, while a reconnaissance drone observes.

To hammer home the point, I want you to realize these drones can come from any direction at any time, making them far more deadly than most helicopters. While helicopters are nimble and can maneuver the battle space, they can’t easily traverse open ground.  Partly to do with the fact that they are both loud and large enough to spot for some distance, helicopters can’t race across open fields safely without fear of MANPADs or AA fire.  Drones, on the other hand, can not only maneuver through extensive forests, but they can also skim far lower to the ground with no risk to the pilot. There are numerous ways to make drones less noisy, with different blades, or to make them more capable of lifting, and this is all basic technology we got from helicopters. I wouldn’t be shocked to see some of the Rotary technology designed for the stealth Blackhawk used on the Osama Bin Laden raid being used on drones in some fashion.

Anyone who’s been around drones knows that sometimes you can hear them, and sometimes you can’t. That depends on the wind, weather, and flight altitude, etc. Despite advancements in detecting drones, these drones can fly through tree lines and are extremely difficult to hit with small arms. The primary issue with small arms now is that even with a shotgun, the kinetic kill might be so close that the payload may kill you anyway. I’m not saying don’t have a shotgun in hand to attack these drones. Just realize that this is the last step in protecting yourself, and probably one of your most vulnerable points. We will discuss other munitions in a later post, but they seem to have much the same issue as the shotgun. The drone can sneak through your lines and target you with very accurate fire, unlike artillery, which may have to be walked on to the target.

Even with the advancement of artillery, it still took up to 8 minutes to get on target. An artillery barrage may or may not be dead-on accurate. Whether the drone can actually hit you depends on many factors. Still, the reality is these drones are highly effective at contact detonations of vehicles and have been seen numerous times killing soldiers without dropping any munitions. One reason I believe the kamikaze drones have become the go-to for killing infantry is that infantry treats dropped munitions the same as artillery, making follow-up bombing with smaller munitions a bit of a problem.

Depiction of the drone’s ability to spot and maneuver toward enemies

Drones and Arty

The destruction of combat equipment and personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces formations encircled on the left bank of the Oskol River, in the area of the special military operation in the Kupyansk direction by artillery crews of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the “West” troop… https://t.co/1N0FueRyGN pic.twitter.com/GDElekKcVN

— 𝐃𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐝 𝐙 🇷🇺 🇮🇪 (@SMO_VZ) November 27, 2025

It has been common practice in a lot of the conflict to send the drones up to get a visual on an enemy and then fire off artillery or rockets on them. This is probably one of the best uses of a drone because it doesn’t sacrifice the device and its reconnaissance capability and there is very little that can be done with artillery incoming on to your position. If artillery is done properly they can fire these rounds and move to another location while being covered by anti air drones allowing a lot of the cheaper munitions to effectively hit targets at a fairly competent distance. This wouldn’t tail some work both logistically and through a coordination that requires some sophistication and training. The standoff of the artillery and its protection via other drones patrolling the skies would be critical to the survival of the artillery systems. This, however, has been done quite effectively by both sides, although the hunter killers have been taking out a vast majority of the artillery they can find, which diminishes this tactic purely from a logistical standpoint.

Distance

Multiple factors come into play when you talk about a drone’s capability to travel into enemy territory. Most aircraft think of distance in terms of flight time, and I’m assuming many drone procedures are set up the same way. If a battery lasts 30 minutes, your travel distance is 15 minutes minus, say, a 5-minute safety buffer. So that drone has a radius of 10 minutes straight out, maybe a 5-minute loiter, then return.  This distance could vary depending on how much energy it takes the drone to accelerate to its location, as well as other factors, such as fuel consumption in helicopters and aircraft. For single-use drones, this may or may not be a factor.  I would guess no one wants to use a drone that can’t find the target, so there might be a return procedure if no recon drone can track it. That means they probably don’t fly out a HUK drone on a mission before getting eyes on a target.

Many drones can fly for quite a while if they are properly built and equipped with the right battery systems. Still other reconnaissance drones may have hours of loiter time, like that of the Predator drones America uses. For the sake of this article, though, we’ll stick with the average drone distances one can expect from various platforms in use, realizing that unless a country manufactures a line of specific drones like the UK-made Spitfires, we won’t have a close answer, only a reasonable guess. These are best guesses based on data we can pull from various sources, not hard facts, because we don’t have solid data on every single, individually built system in the war. That said, both you, as a potential drone defender, and an attacker must realize that there is a time factor, not a specific distance in kilometers or miles. If a drone has to fight a headwind to you, it may have less time on station, or you might be just out of reach, until the weather changes.

Short- to medium-range systems from recon to attack.

• Consumer / small drones:Can fly from 6.4 to 11.3 km (4–7 miles) under ideal conditions, though some can exceed 14.5 km (9 miles).
• Small FPV drones:Some FPV (first-person-view) drones have been used for strikes over 60 km (37 miles) by using upgraded hardware and relay systems, but many are within a 2-4km range (1-2miles)
• Tethered drones:Fiber-optic drones can reach up to 50 km (30 miles) because they are physically tethered to their controller, but factors like wind and cable sag can limit this

There are drones considered strategic, with much longer operational ranges; some are strike drones, others reconnaissance drones.  The Ukrainian Lyutyi drones have been seen to fly 1,000 km (621 miles), and some Ukrainian strikes have been 1,800 km (1,118 miles), while the Russians have Shahed drones with a range of 1,800-2,500 km (1,118-1,553 miles).  A factor in all these drones, though, is their ability to be operated remotely, which can significantly reduce operational distances. Depending on the situation and the systems being used, some of these drones may be autonomous and GPS-guided, or have remote guidance at the end of their attack run for deep penetration.

There are a few ways to operate drones remotely, but they require some knowledge of radio technology. While fiber-optic drones can reach long distances, given the platform, there are ways to mitigate the limited range of smaller consumer drones. The first technique is simply operating the drone in its standard format, with the operator within range of the drone unassisted. This gets you the four to seven miles in optimal conditions that most drones are capable of doing, provided there aren’t any restrictions digitally baked into the software.  Other ways to extend range include raising an antenna high enough on a tower to maintain line of sight. If this is done with a good Yagi antenna and boosting the transmitter power, you can see these drones travelling farther. Your average visual range on the ground is 3 miles, which increases to almost 10 miles at 50 feet above ground. So the higher you get, the more potential range you can have, but with both sides blowing towers down as fast as they are put up, this might not be possible in flat terrain.

Repeater Drones

Another way is to use a repeater system that receives input and retransmits it to the drone. This could be flown on a drone or set up in clandestine locations. Mothership drones are becoming commonplace, with repeater systems allowing attack ranges of 20km (12miles) into enemy territory. The issue with this is that repeaters can be hunted down and compromised or destroyed if not secured by security forces. Another technique is to use software to lift a drone along a predetermined course, send it along a GPS-coordinated track for reconnaissance and return, extending its range. Open-source software like Ardupilot has been widely used for a variety of long-range autonomous operations.  Regardless of the navigational system, this is very much in line with drone uses back during Vietnam and later, where film was used.

Last but not least would be a handoff drone where one operator lifts the drone and sends it to a designated location for another operator to reacquire the signal and direct the final moments of the attack into a target. This allows you to stage drones farther back, in more protected or secluded areas, away from a battle zone. Tactically, though, most drone operations are being conducted relatively close to the front lines, out of semi-destroyed buildings or bunker systems, with antennas run some distance away to prevent direct strikes on the operators themselves.  I believe many of the options discussed above have been tested enough that most tactical operations are not conducted this way; instead, troops within a few miles of a target engage it. However, we do see exceptions to those rules quite often from reconnaissance drones and mothership drones.  Due to the EW environment, much of the front lines are full of jamming, so drone operators are flying repeater drones/mothership drones through the EW band to strike the back area.  This seems to have had mixed results, though.

Repeater Drones

Lastly, I want to touch on the ambush drone strikes primarily going on by Russia at the moment.  Russians are saving battery by landing the drones and waiting for unsuspecting vehicles or personnel to come by, which is an interesting tactic.  These ambush tactics do work as they extend the time a drone can actively engage an enemy. That said, it seems like a waste of these HUK drones, but I think they are showing something that isn’t reality.  Drones sitting on the ground don’t waste much energy and can be sent home in a direct flight when batteries get low, but they must land in an open field.  Here are my two issues with this.  Without Recon drones, the loitering drone has very little visibility, so why would you waste your time on the ground with the equivalent of a peephole’s worth of view?  They are susceptible to enemy recon drones, and they must park in obvious areas that drone pilots can see.

Now here is what I think isn’t being said.  I believe these ambushes are being carried out by recon spotting troops moving in a given direction, and that these drones are landing to conserve power and wait to be fully activated.  They might be in a receive-only mode, waiting for activation, giving out no EW signs beyond the recon drone, which might be fiber-optic controlled.  When the ambush is to be initiated, the recon drone activates and possibly retransmits the HUK info.  At the end of the war, we will see if my guess is correct.

https://x.com/markito0171/status/1995552563908038684?s=20
Drone killing an ambush drone.

The Secret Not-So-Secret Strategy

Another key aspect that is absolutely not being talked about by either side is how the drone evolution from the larger loitering drones, sometimes called MALE (Medium-altitude long-endurance) or HALE (High-altitude long-endurance), had its day but are almost not seen anymore. Anti-air systems easily attacked these larger drones, causing them to fall from grace in the 2022 to 2023 time frame. These drone systems were more of a reconnaissance asset than anything else, but they were being lost at such high rates, and their cost was substantially higher than that of the smaller drones; they stopped flying them. It made no sense to keep them in the air when smaller platforms would do the same job. That said, it is believed that between 70% and 90% of all drones flown in the conflict are being shot down or knocked out of the air by various means. Much of this is probably due to EW warfare rather than actual kinetic strikes on drones, but both sides have made ample strides in making drone assets far more capable in the air-to-air role.

A recent post on X showed the Ukrainian 3D-printed STING drones being produced.  This drone is built explicitly after the fast-flying drone that was going after the Guinness World Records. While these drones don’t need to set any records, they do need to be faster than the average drone flying around, and they have that capability.  Even though these systems cost, according to Ukrainian accounts, about $ 2,100 per unit, you can see they are far cheaper than most of the munitions the Americans carry.  An unguided AT4 rocket cost $1480 to produce in 1999; in 2025, it cost $2857.  That isn’t even scratching the surface of how much a javelin missile system costs taxpayers. So with relatively cheap systems being launched both for attacking and defending these conflicts, drone warfare is more about mass than it is about intricate and well-refined weapon systems. Just as German tanks statistically outclassed the Sherman, mass has its own unique properties.  Having recently held a book in my hands about the shortages of World War II munitions and the intricacies of the subcommittee dealing with it, one can only guess how much more difficult it is to do this during a time of war.

While anything can be countered with enough time, effort, and technology, sometimes a large amount of munitions or weapon systems can outperform quality. Given the lower cost of many of these drone systems compared to your average weapon system on the market today, it doesn’t make sense to invest in things like the Javelin missile, especially in wars like this. This isn’t a subtraction from the javelin missile, but the reality is that many of our weapon systems are outdated for the emerging warfare. I believe Ukraine understands this principle far better than both Russia and America do. I hope I’m wrong at least on the American side of this argument, but it seems the following article will present my concerns a bit better, so I will delay the discussion until then. Even though Ukraine pioneered the concept of mass drone attacks on Russia with great success, Russia learned its lesson. That said, even though Ukraine is at the forefront of technology and tactics, Russia’s logistical and industrial capabilities make it hard for Ukraine to maintain its lead. However, time will tell if all the EU/American assistance can counterbalance Russia.

As drone distances increase, jamming becomes more prevalent and detrimental to the systems. Even with the embargo restrictions, both nations are running the exact same technology on these larger drone systems, including the ground transportation drones. They are running Starlink systems either by direct purchase in Ukraine or by proxy from the Middle East, in Russia’s case. These systems are generally installed after-market on some of the higher-end model drones, which makes it very difficult to jam. The nature of the system, the transmission of different frequencies across a wide spectrum, and satellite handoff every few minutes preclude a lot of the jamming technologies that are normally used. Not only that, but both sides are using the same system to operate these drones, which would mean they would have to jam their own technology. It seems to be an unwritten rule by both sides that jamming this spectrum would be as detrimental as it would be effective, and neither side seems to want to close that loophole off at this time. Although I suspect Russia has a better capability of jamming that frequency spectrum in house than Ukraine does.

Targets from the Horse’s Mouth

https://sbs-group.army/en/

Without delving into this too much, all numbers should be subject to scrutiny and questioning from all parties involved. I’m not saying that these numbers are inaccurate or accurate, but having studied both nations quite heavily during college, I can say without a doubt that exaggeration of capabilities is a common practice for this region and both nations. That said, we can obviously find out what they are attacking and get a basic understanding of what their go to’s are currently. If somebody wants to draw a lot of information from this and deep dive into it, I would be more than willing to add that information, but I have limited time to really draw any deep conclusions. The central question I have arises from the fact that much of this information is at best suspect. What do they consider an ammo fuel or equipment depot? Also, why are Mrs. Sam’s and anti-aircraft guns mixed into one pile?

The large thing to see on the website is how many different groups are actually operating these drones, and the activity Bing displayed at near real time makes me question a lot of this. I’m not sure if the Russians have anything like this, and probably won’t find out because my Russian speaking skills are not up to tracking that down. It is a significant value to promote such events in the game in a manner that could be a paradigm shift for many drone operators. This is something definitely to watch, and seeing that they have a focus on radar systems, EW, and drone launch sites should be key information to us. I’m also interested in seeing if that enemy personnel is connected to all the alleged vehicles being destroyed as well. Like I’ve stated before, we will never know this exact information and probably won’t have a good understanding for years to come. What is noticeable is the assumptions on wounded versus killed and damaged versus destroyed. This could be a whole topic on its own, but I will leave this to the people who like to number crunch because they will draw out better information than I will.

Are FPV Drones the most effective?

https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-fought-in-ukraine-and-heres-why-fpv-drones-kind-of-suck/

This is a difficult question to answer, and I don’t know whether there is a definitive source of information. I will note that, given the high proportion of drones that don’t reach their targets and the lack of a breakdown of which drones are assigned to which targets, overall, questions are raised about their capability relative to other systems, such as artillery. One of the key questions that we will have was brought up by not just the above author but by various people who watched the drone footage. Many FPV drone strikes, both by the Ukrainians and the Russians, are on already disabled or destroyed vehicles. In many cases, I believe this is done solely to cause confirmed destruction and produce a propaganda video of the attack. That said, much like the news, it is difficult to determine where people’s statistics come from. Minus the French author, who I tend to believe is very accurate in his reviews, and Jakob, I tend to see with more clarity what’s truly going on.

Again, this is supposition based on a few people and not hard facts, but I don’t think anyone has solid facts. For instance, Jacob has explicitly stated that a lot of his attacks that went in were on targets that had already been disabled by other means. Now, this doesn’t mean that a reconnaissance drone didn’t erect those rounds. He says about 43% of his sorties ended with the drone successfully hitting a target after identifying it. This is also to include the munitions going off. He doesn’t state whether they had duds, which I know they have. He also discussed pre-aborted missions, which would drop the success rate between 20 and 30% which, as he says, isn’t a bad number in itself. What really interested me was the fact that he said of those targets that hadn’t been previously prosecuted, he believes that the actual FPV drone strikes drop down to the single digits.

He also notes that many of these drones are being deployed by commanders who are not paying for them, and offers an interesting fiscal view of the drone’s cost: about $500 in materials, compared with other munitions, which are about 100 rounds per shot. Add to that that there is also a time of day when a lot of this can’t be easily used against the enemy. Another point he raises is something anyone dealing with SIGINT will understand: radio waves do not pass through certain objects. If we exclude all his conversation about on the job training and how difficult a lot of these bare bones drones are to fly getting a reliable connection even without electronic warfare systems being active can be daunting you could go around the side of a building that is mostly metal or concrete and lose that signal which means there are opportunities for people to hide if they know where the potential enemy is positioned. The other issue he raises is how frequently the operational area is filled with drones, which can overwhelm certain systems. That said, these drones could be conducting a screening operation for more sophisticated systems, such as fiber-wire drones or relay drones. One of the key issues he raised was that they’re using simple, inexpensive off-the-shelf items with limited frequency availability. Add in active jamming on both sides, oftentimes, most of the operators try to use the drone’s inertia to hit a target after they lose control. This also poses a problem because they cannot determine whether the drone actually hit the target. I suspect that some of the claims of damaging enemies that are posted online are probable hits and not actual verified hits.

Many companies are designing drone systems that mitigate the problems that come along with all the electronic warfare and jamming going on in the battle space on both sides. One of the key features is pixel lock which allows a drone to pick up a target and then fly in using a simple processor like a Raspberry Pi. The reason this is becoming more popular in many ways than say the fiber optic drone, which we’ve discussed, and we’ll continue to bring up, ‘s because of the fragile nature of the fiber optics. This is not to say that fiber optic drones don’t have their place and capabilities, but train wood lines and other features make these drones very difficult to fly in any direction other than a straight line towards the target. Deviating or maneuvering can create a problem for these drones and cause the wire to snap, sending these drones generally off to detonate prematurely. However, these drones are far more capable of flying into a target and actually hitting that target if it isn’t moving. The other problem with these fiber optic drones is that much of the navigation can’t be done with the GPS system, so these are flown in by the pilots, who must navigate like pilots in World War 1. Train association becomes a pinnacle attribute for a lot of these pilots, and this also includes the FPV drone as well. What are some of the tactics of flying these drones with reconnaissance drones assisting in navigation and acquisition of the target? This isn’t always the case.

Which drones do I see ruling the battlespace?

Strategically, I see both reconnaissance and bomber drones as the most capable of the available systems. Because bomber drones are designed to survive an attack and return, it is worth the financial investment to add specific systems to enable their return. That said, the reconnaissance drone is going to be paramount, and I think a lot of this is going to do with the fact that the US military has fairly accurate indirect fire systems. Instead of launching a horde of FPV drones, it might be more beneficial to have a few reconnaissance drones and some anti-air drones to protect it, along with our modern indirect fire capabilities. If we have a handful of interceptor drones protecting these ground assets, the fighters in the drone space, we then control the air. This would allow precision strikes, along with tanks, to move out and engage in what they do best with far less risk. I believe the advancement of technology to enable interceptor drones to engage other air assets will be a major hurdle on the technological side.

To finish this article, I want to say that we will discuss the different drone styles that have been developed. Many of these drone comparisons have already been made in article 1, but I will show a little more information and dig a little deeper into what they are and how they are used. Lastly, I will talk about the US military’s development of drones and why I think they are doing some of the dumbest crap I’ve seen so far. It’s as if no one in the industry has spent any time reviewing any of these wars and why these drones are so effective. Realistically, I think many of the officers, staff, and intelligence officials are negligent about the capabilities and why these capabilities are so devastating compared to previous technologies, but that will be in the following article.