How “Gentle” Would A Russian-Armenian “Divorce” Really Be?

Instead of waiting for Pashinyan to hold a referendum on joining the EU, which he might never end up doing in order to retain the advantages from membership in the Eurasian Economic Union for as long as possible, Putin might cut Armenia off right away if Pashinyan wins re-election by hook or by crook.

A journalist asked Putin over the weekend about his reaction to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan hosting Zelensky last week and giving him a platform to threaten Russia. Putin dodged that part of the question but elaborated on the future of their ties. Russia wants only the best for Armenia and will respect its people’s wishes, he said, in connection with which he proposed that they hold a referendum on Pashinyan’s plans to join the EU since that policy risks ruining economic ties with Russia.

As a reminder, Putin said that a little less than one-quarter of Armenia’s GDP comes from trade with Russia, around $7 billion out of $29 billion last year. The advantages that it derives from membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union apply to “agriculture, the processing industry, customs and other duties, and so on and so forth. This also applies to migration.” If its people decide to end them, Putin said, then Russia will begin the process of “a gentle, intelligent and mutually beneficial divorce.”

Putin hosted Pashinyan for candid talks in early April that were assessed here as representing the moment of truth in their relations. The day after, “A Top Russian Official Rang The Alarm About Deteriorating Relations With Armenia”, specifically condemning last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) for upsetting the regional geostrategic balance. This was followed last week by the EU solidifying its influence in Armenia ahead of next month’s elections.

The writing is on the wall and it reads that Pashinyan, whether by hook or by crook, will win re-election and consequently subordinate Armenia to the West for turbocharging the TRIPP-driven expansion of its influence along Russia’s entire southern periphery. Their mutual Azeri neighbor’s new de facto alliance with Ukraine naturally spikes Russia’s threat assessment of it and raises the risk of protracted instability across the broader region for the reasons explained here.

What’s unfolding along Russia’s southern flank is the outcome of what can be described as the Neo-Reagan Doctrine, or Trump 2.0’s accelerated rolling back of Russian influence across the world, with a special focus on its “sphere of influence” known as the “Near Abroad”. If this isn’t reversed in Armenia through the patriotic opposition’s victory against all odds, and if Pashinyan swiftly moves to harm Russian interests even more than he already has, then their “divorce” might not be so “gentle”.

The rise of Russia’s hardliner faction that was touched upon here reduces the likelihood of Putin agreeing to retain Armenia’s previously mentioned benefits from the Eurasian Economic Union. Instead, if Russian influence in Armenia is irreversibly lost for the indefinite future (with or without a referendum on Pashinyan’s policy of joining the EU), then he might just cut it off right away. The goal might be to spark a last-ditch patriotic uprising and then let Russia’s foes take care of wayward Armenia if that fails.

Far from a “gentle” divorce, it might be a very nasty one, and the end result could be the Azeri-Turkish Axis formalizing Armenia’s status as their joint “Neo-Ottoman Sanjak” with all the socio-cultural costs that were predicted here. If that’s seemingly inevitable in the event of Pashinyan’s re-election by hook or by crook, the hardliners might argue, then it’s better to radically speed everything up in the hopes that shocking Armenians might get them to resist instead of letting it slowly unfold till it’s too late to reverse.