Groundgame in Iran? They’ve lost the Plot Already

Proxy forces are always sketchy at best. They sound great in Beltway circles, especially among the political class. But the long term outcomes are impossible to gauge and that’s assuming you achieve a short term success. That said we seem to be obsessed with the concept, leaning on them exclusively since the days of the Arab Spring as a barely deniable way to achieve geopolitical gains without any of the messy losses. Oh and, its great for the military industrial complex.

I recall Aquil Collins’ personal account of the Iraqi invasion back in 2003. This was the days back before he got pinched in Mexico and ultimately dropped off the radar, living low in the mountains of Arizona until he unfortunately succumbed far too early to a life of personal neglect. Most know his for his exploits in Chechnya contained in his autobiography “My Jihad”. But he continued to live quite a life after the events of the book, even offering his services to the CIA, leading a personal invasion and foster a guerrilla network based on old contacts. Now, anyone who’s worked in that part of the world and knows a bit about running sources knew they’d turn him down, but not for a lack of devout eagerness on his part. There was a another plan at work and it didn’t include raising a questionably effective Sunni force from the south.

Collins wasn’t wrong, just early. And less than trustworthy in many of the handlers’ eyes who’d ran him as an asset shadowing several of the 9/11 hijackers. This would in fact be the strategy just one decade later in that so-called Arab Spring. And he wasn’t a bad guy despite his controversial life decisions. Aquil always made for an interesting conversation and treated even complete strangers as friends, so long as he respected you as a fellow Warrior. He did, and still does through his books, offer a unique perspective on a segment of the world wildly different than most in the West are accustomed. But perhaps most interesting to me was the very nature of transnational groups largely used as pawns for larger national interests. And it is certainly the case today as it was way back in the 90s when Aquil made the trek into Dagestan largely on foot from the perennial farm of disposable jihadis for hire, Azerbaijan.

Prison uniforms discarded after ISIS Syrian prison break in early 2026. Image via Telegram.

Today we find ourselves in the Iran quagmire. Without a ground force airpower is largely moot, as we have seen. Iran is perhaps an even worse tactical problem than Afghanistan, terrain wise, technological advances and backing notwithstanding. It has been my opinion since Operation Epic Fury kicked off at the tail end of February that the ground game was inadvertently triggered early which led to the mass killings in the streets. All the ingredients were there – social media parroted the grainy videos and unverified reports of gatherings, this time utilizing Telegram largely in lieu of X as they had in Syria as HTS quickly took Damascus. The problem is more complicated in Iran – the internal state security apparatus was far stronger than anticipated and, after a decade of watching the failings of other nations amid the color revolution tactics, they were ready willing and able to intervene in the most brutal of ways. The pieces were not in place, at least not in the degree needed, to support the protesters on the ground taking it beyond the mass demonstrations. And they lost, badly.

Since the bombardment phase began the question remains: what’s the plan on the ground? Tehran has no incentive to stop any program at this point, with the current success rate of their attacks along with the effects on global trade. Washington can make all the noise it likes, at the end of the day without tangible tactical goals being attained the long term effect is nigh. Further, tragic missteps like the bombing of the children’s school and the open targeting of infrastructure is eroding whatever favor may have been fostered with the populace. No sane person is considering an American Infantry push, especially not now with our major hubs in Kuwait heavily damaged. Further, a sustainment plan for said troops would be nearly impossible. In Afghanistan we had Kyrgyzstan and the skies were not contested. In Iraq, Kuwait remained the major logistics hub. Plus its bloody. Very, very bloody. So who’s gonna fight?

First the media buzz said the Kurds. That fell apart quickly despite being the suspected conduit by which Starlink, among other supplies, was provided to the Iranian dissidents. Kurdistan remembers how Washington fed them to the Turkish wolves last time around, and reminded the world that they’re not simply a people for hire. The narrative shifted to Baluchistan, which was laughable to anyone with trigger time in southern Afghanistan. They’re about as reliable as your local pillhead and have no interest in much aside from protecting their tribal areas. Interestingly the Azeris came up. Ah, yes. The jihadi farm itself, still gloating over the drones the Israelis gave them to kill Armenians. But the problem with Azeris is that, while they’re not geographically far from Tehran, they’re a hideously poor fighting force at best and generally lose interest in fighting in the organized sense once they start taking substantial losses. One can look to the rapid disintegration of ISIS for an example.

Azeri ISIS leader photographed somewhere in Azerbaijan, late 2025.

Azerbaijan is historically a cultural offshoot of Turkey. And while Baku, like Istanbul, can be a mixed bag of secularists and hardliners, they are outside the purview of most prying eyes. So it was no surprise last week when the ground game question resumed that Azeris began showing up in Damascus. That’s where it all went sideways – surprising no one, even faster than I was willing to concede. What in the hell happened and how did it happen so fast?

On Telegram the HTS government officials in Damascus explained why they aided the prison break of the old ISIS fighters. This comes right on the heels of fighters from Baku being invited into Damascus and Turkey ordering its troops to pull back from its tense southern border it shares with Kurdistan regions of Syria and Iraq. The moves followed an announcement by Washington that a new pipeline project would be underway, enriching the Kurds, Syria, and Turkey while alleviating the traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. It was a big beautiful deal, the best deal, and everyone loves a good deal. Except that you’re dealing with people on all sides who are notoriously bad at long term alignment with US objectives.

Syrian HTS prison guard burning discarded ISIS uniforms post-prison break. Via Telegram.

Bad blood has a way of boiling over quick and this time was no different – the Kurds, due to their geographic location, were likely to be the logistics component while putting pressure on the IRGC mountain warfare units in their semi-autonomous tribal region inside Iran. Down south, the Sunni hardliners would move in. It appears as though the IRGC took the bait as well, moving their heavy assets to the southwest and hammering the border crossings. Within days the proxy force began fraying at the seams. The Arabs and Azeris called a shura and the Kurdish tribes did the same, with the latter very correctly pointing out how quickly the jihadis were immediately resuming their old ways. In fact firsthand chatter is stating ISIS is back to  conducting attacks on Kurds. But why wouldn’t they simply hold their fire and attack Iran from Azerbaijan, if that’s a natural hub and the easiest route in? Well…the fact that Iran has not attacked Baku since last March because the country holds the oil pipeline vital to everyone’s interest in the region. Doesn’t make it immune, mind you, but no one in their right mind wants another Nordstream. Plausible deniability, however thin a veil it may be, is maintained through the economic lifeblood that exists.

Having spent a good portion of my adult life in the region and directly with the groups mentioned, the best intentions at work here predictably run amok. The ground game that worked on Libya and Syria are far more complicated to pull off correctly in Iran based on ethnic differences alone, leaving out the fact that Sunni Arabs have no hope of fostering goodwill with Persian Shias. Relying on violently disparate groups to somehow form a shaky alliance long enough to create an intangible economic guarantee has historically been a fool’s errand. These people have long memories and march to the beat of their own drum. And who can blame them? I can’t help but wonder what Aquil would have to say about it all, being that one of the persistent themes he shared was just how ignorant Western Intelligence can be. As we would share a decade ago it didn’t seem to change, nor does it appear to be the case today. All parties seem to have lost the plot, unable to stay on task long enough to get past their own line of scrimmage. Perhaps most important is that these things take a lot of time and money to get right and now the IC is working against the midterms clock. Personally I don’t have high expectations. But, as they say, we shall see.

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