Don Shift Sends: 10 Lessons on Radio Usage for SHTF from the Chechen Wars

Taken from “Chechen Radio Practices”: Timothy L. Thomas, “Russian Tactical Lessons Learned Fighting Chechen Separatists,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 18:4 (2005), pp. 731-766 https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040500355015

Also: Robert K. Ackerman, “Echoes of Chechnya Warfare Resound in Moscow, Quantico,” SIGNAL Magazine, May 2000 https://www.afcea.org/signal/archives/content/may00/echoes-may.html

Note: this is an excerpt from my new, revised 2nd edition of Basic SHTF Radio, A cop’s brief guide for understanding simple solutions for SHTF radio communication, available on Amazon.

Lesson 1

Thomas: “Chechens—shift frequencies during radio transmissions to avoid intercepts; Russians—continually scan all frequencies while retaining active ones already intercepted.”

Ackerman: “In addition to not using cryptography, they did not regularly change frequencies because of the logistics challenges of synchronizing the process among every unit. U.S. forces, by comparison, change their communications format every 24 hours.”

Radio frequency sweeps, either done by a scanner and listening, or looking for a signal on a waterfall display, is how active transmissions are detected. Communications intelligence specialists tune in and listen or otherwise analyze the signal to gain intelligence. In the Russians’ case, not only did they listen to all the radio frequencies that could be used, but they also paid special attention to ones they knew the Chechens used in the past.

For the civilian, this means that if you know your enemy will be transmitting on GMRS radios, you will listen to those frequencies in particular. Additionally, you’ll be scanning the rest of the spectrum just in case. It needs to be noted that some scanners check frequencies faster than others as the receiver is actually tuning from frequency to frequency and very briefly listening for a signal. A software defined radio (SDR) that will show a signal visually on a waterfall display may be better for your signals intelligence (SIGINT) purposes than hoping a scanner on a five-second cycle hits on three-second transmission.

Using portions of the radio spectrum where your signals are not expected, for instance using radio to talk on marine frequencies well inland, may initially hide your signal from scans of land mobile bands where you are expected. However, savvy listeners will be looking at the entire spectrum looking for just such a trick, thus it is necessary to constantly change frequencies. This can be done simply by having a frequency change schedule with predesignated frequencies.

Frequency hopping is problematic for civilian radios and will probably not be an option for most partisans. One technique to obfuscate the conversation is to have parties transmitting on different frequencies. Party A transmits on Frequency 1 while listening to Frequency 2 where Party B is transmitting. That way, anyone with an unsophisticated radio or a scanner will pick up only half of the conversation. This can be countered by having two receivers checking the airwaves for the other half.

Lesson 2

Thomas: “Chechens—misinformation and overt intelligence “give-aways” used to fool federal forces and conceal real intentions; Russians—focus attention on “conventional words” and specific terminology used along with the bait.”

Ackerman: “Russian forces also were subjected to massive onslaughts of disinformation. Dilegge reports that Russian units, were almost frozen, by confusion sowed in part by the Chechens. In one case in 1996, Chechens broadcast fake radio traffic from imaginary units in the clear for the Russians to deliberately hear.”

The Chechen tactic of giving deliberately incorrect information in the clear is an old tactic. Say something that the enemy wants to hear in the open and hope he is stupid enough to believe it. The real trick is that a smart enemy will be suspicious of any such information that seems too good to be true. Such deceptions that have been successful in the past and the key was to make the messages seem believable.

Creating fake military units and sending out radio signals is a tactic nearly 100 years old. General Patton supposedly headed up a large army that was to invade France at the Pas de Calais. Radio signals were sent from mobile units simulating a real army, transmitting exactly as they would in reality, so German SIGINT would pick them up to substantiate other intelligence they received. Thus, Hitler discarded reports that Normandy was the D-Day target.

US Navy officers sent out various messages that identified certain Pacific facilities in order to smoke out the Japanese fleet’s target. Each base was given a specific code and a problem. Since we had broken the Japanese code, when we intercepted the transmission “AF is out of fresh water,” we knew the target was Midway Island.

Russian intelligence focused on contextual clues to get around the use of codewords. Reading into the “bait” disinformation allowed them to potentially discern what the Chechens were trying to hide or accomplish, such as luring the Russians into an ambush.

Lesson 3

Thomas: “Chechens—use more than one language when transmitting to confuse listeners; Russians—keep several interpreters on duty at any one time.”

Ackerman: “…the Chechens had a native form of secure communications. While virtually every Chechen speaks Russian, almost no Russians speak Chechen. By adding a few simple code phrases, the rebels could communicate in the open without fear of interception in a manner similar to that of the U.S. Army’s Navaho code talkers in the European theater. In addition, most of the Chechen radio operators recognized each other by voice.”

Pretty self-explanatory. In the United States, the “other” language is Spanish which is so common it might as well be English. Smaller communities or groups might utilize friendly immigrants of smaller minorities to serve as code-talkers, such as Koreans. Note that government forces will have interpreters at their disposal so this method is not recommended except against unsophisticated forces.

Any uncommon language that’s unlikely to be spoken by the enemy can be used as a layer of obfuscation, but not as unbreakable code. For instance, if your enemy is an urban gang that has zero education even basic French might as well be Martian to them. The danger is that someone who does speak the language may be translating under duress or actively aiding the enemy.

Recognizing each other by voice is also important because it reduces the need for callsigns that can be later analyzed to develop intelligence. Familiar voices also serve to reduce disinformation being introduced by a hostile native speaker entering your communications.

Lesson 4

Thomas: “Chechens—place radio sets and antennas in operational mode on trees as repeaters to avoid detection and remain intact if fired upon by artillery; Russians—use additional course and bearing indicators mounted on helicopters to locate more than one point of transmission.”

Don’t poop where you eat. Chechens knew that the Russians could triangulate the transmitter’s location and attack it. This is a well-known tactic in the modern warfare arena and a really good way to die. Modern military command posts are sited well away from their antennas whenever possible, especially at the higher echelon levels. Low-loss cables might run the signals from the headquarters to the antennas hundreds of meters away, so, in the event of an air or artillery strike, the actual command post is not hit.

Chechens basically ran portable radios as expendable repeaters in order to be able to transmit safely. The operator’s radio sent probably a low-power, directional frequency to the repeater set which then sent out the higher power signal from a remote position. The disadvantage to this is that Russians stopped being fooled by the repeater radio and started looking for the signal from the actual operator’s transceiver.

Lesson 5

Thomas: “Chechens—use deep ravines and canyons as natural corridors for radio waves to make intercepts impossible; Russians—place radio intercept equipment on vectors of transmissions on axes of ravines and canyons in plateau areas of Chechnya.”

Line-of-sight radio like VHF/UHF are blocked by terrain and even buildings. A radio in a natural or urban canyon won’t necessarily get the signal over the rim, although the signal will travel longitudinally up and down that canyon or valley. Basically, the Chechens were using radios where they couldn’t be, or were unlikely to be, intercepted.

Both parties were using the strengths and weaknesses of the terrain to their advantage. Russians listened by monitoring radio waves at the exits to the terrain features where they knew the signals would penetrate; the Chechens’ weakness was Russian Intelligence’s strength. Directional antennas and mobile transmission/interception improve capabilities on each end.

Lesson 6

Thomas: “Chechens—use radios as auxiliary facilities only for notification of when and where to meet a messenger with information; Russians—pay particular attention not only to contents of transmission but to location of both respondents.”

Meeting face-to-face is always the best way to avoid giving away intelligence through communications interception. On The Sopranos we’re always seeing Tony get a phone call where he has to urgently leave to talk to an associate regarding a crime. This defeats FBI wiretaps. Likewise, Chechens could arrange a meeting to plan or have couriers exchange order/intelligence.

However, the FBI, like the Russians, can analyze who is calling. The message itself may be unimportant. They may recognize the participants by voice and know where the call/transmission is coming from. Surveillance assets could then follow the parties as they move to a meeting location. Snatch squads could be waiting or other eavesdropping techniques may be used in person.

Lesson 7

Thomas: “Chechens—constant change of nicknames and call-signs to produce uncertainty as to who is on the air; Russians—learn not only frequencies and nicknames but also personal linguistic traits of respondents.”

Ackerman: “…Russian forces ignored many other basic communications security procedures. […] Chechen officials claim that they could intercept Russian tactical communications on their own commercial off-the-shelf radios. Code phrases used by the Russians in open communications were easily deciphered and understood.”

COMSEC (communications security) is what keeps your transmissions from being used against you. Russians weren’t using encryption meaning that anyone who could tune in the frequency could hear what they were saying. On top of this, Russians spoke plainly or had such bad codes that they were easily figured out. “Go to Maine from Florida” is easily deciphered by someone who knows geography.

The Chechens kept things unpredictable. Traffic pattern analysis might tell you that the callsign 3-Boy-11 on sheriff’s Channel 1, which gives out locations in the Fillmore, CA, area during daytime hours, typically on the western side of the city, and talks about patrol-type incidents, is the dayshift county deputy for the Fillmore/Santa Paula area. If the callsign changes daily, it becomes harder for someone to know who is assigned to what area to do what.

Callsigns and the behavior associated with them can give away too much and conversely be used against a complacent enemy. North Vietnamese radar operators could identify vulnerable attack formations by their route, flight patterns, and callsigns. For instance, in Operation Bolo, Col. Robin Olds’ plan to kill Vietnamese MiGs, his fighters pretended to be F-105 attack aircraft through mimicry. The fighters flew similar routes and profiles to the F-105s and used the same radio lingo. Anyone listening and looking at a radar screen would assume it was just more easily shot down F-105s. Olds’ tried (unsuccessfully) to use F-105-style callsigns instead of the car-brand callsigns that fighters always used. Even so, the Vietnamese took the bait and attacked Olds’ F-4s in the trap he had laid, leading to a series of American aerial victories.

Another further point taken is voice analysis. If you listen to the radio long enough you can recognize someone by their voice. In one incident, we heard the sounds of a struggle on the radio one day but had no idea which unit it was. Eventually, the deputy got on the radio long enough to call for help. We still didn’t know where he was, but based on recognizing his voice, we knew who he was, what beat he was on, and where he was likely to be. Chechens used this to their advantage.

For an enemy intelligence officer monitoring and recording your radio traffic, he can learn to identify your voice. Recognition becomes a bad thing. Voices can be run through processing software to create voiceprints and ID them against things like YouTube videos the same way facial recognition matched January 6th protesters to their DMV photos for later arrest. An enemy monitoring your traffic can know you by voice, when you transmit, where you transmit from, what equipment and frequencies you use, and what you talk about.

Lesson 8

Thomas: “Chechens—intercept federal forces transmissions to gain intelligence; Russians—use alternative media and channels unavailable to insurgents.”

Ackerman: “…Chechen officials, who also equipped women and children with these radios for intelligence purposes, say these handheld units were so valuable that they would have equipped every rebel with one if they could have afforded it.”

First, COMINT (communications intelligence) and SIGINT (signals intelligence) were used to great effect by Chechens against the Russians. Unencrypted information transmitted openly was intercepted and turned into an intelligence product. A contemporary American analogue would be a criminal listening to a police scanner to know when he needs to escape. Russian locations could also be identified by triangulating where their transmissions were coming from.

Second, using civilians as spotters or to pass real time intelligence reports was invaluable to the Chechens. A civilian who just saw a squad take up positions in the house next door could instantly relay that information to a Chechen commander. This would be like a homeowner calling 911 because burglars kicked in the neighbor’s front door versus running down to the police station. The intelligence picture and the ability to respond to enemy movements grows with the amount of information fed into it.

Lesson 9

Ackerman: “The Chechens also had six large Motorola base relay stations, which they placed on the high ground. The Russians could see the sites and their antennas during the day, but they only risked attacking them at night. By then, Chechen forces would have moved the sites. The Chechens claimed that they were in radio communications at distances of up to 100 kilometers (65 miles).”

These “base relay stations” are almost certainly repeaters. We know that repeaters provide a very valuable capability in extending the reach of radio signals over long distances and into dead zones. However, because they are static and re-transmit regularly, they are easy to locate using direction-finding (DF) techniques even if the antennas aren’t immediately obvious. Skilled amateur operators enjoy DF’ing for fun, so such triangulation of a repeater is easily within the abilities of a domestic antagonist.

The Chechens succeeded here because of an inexplicable Russian inability to destroy the sites by air which should have been trivial for them. American miliary forces would have no such problems. Without military grade artillery or other long-range precision fires capabilities, a domestic militia would have difficulty attacking a repeater site except by direct assault. I suspect here that the weather, poor Russian precision targeting, and the location of these sites deep within Chechen held territory made them virtually impossible to destroy.

The lesson that the citizen defender can take from this is that repeaters may be viable under certain circumstances, which are:

  • No attack aircraft or artillery;
  • The sites are in remote, defensible locations;
  • The sites are credibly defended; and,
  • Repeaters are routinely moved.

Any foe that has access to aircraft or artillery, such as a military force, will negate much of this advice. Note that suicide drones (UCAVs) can be used to deliver explosives to a repeater site.

For example, if a militia controls a high-rise district or a tall building, a repeater can be emplaced that is not with reach of the enemy or his bullets. To attack the repeater, the enemy would have to place an anti-material sniper with a sight line to literally shoot the repeater itself to bits. Otherwise, enemy forces would need to assault the building and physically destroy the communications equipment.

The same principles apply to peaks or hills. If a large, contested area needed to be traversed before arriving at the site, the enemy may deem it too risky to attempt to attack the facility. For instance imagine trying to fight from one end of Manhattan to the other. This is all before the enemy actually gets to the site which should, and better be, quite seriously defended.

Failure to move the site allows an enemy to plan and prepare an attack while concentrating the necessary forces against it. A site that moves daily dramatically reduces the time available for tactical preparations. An example of a site that did eventually come under attack, despite being remotely located on a mountaintop, is Lima Site 85. This CIA-operated navigation, targeting, and intelligence site in Laos was taken by communist forces in a combined air-ground assault. Interestingly, during the defense an Air America Huey managed to score a kill against a Vietnamese biplane by shooting it down with an AK-47.

Lesson 10

Ackerman: “[Chechen forces were] equipped with a new commercial Motorola handheld radio purchased abroad. Russian forces, on the other hand, were using tactical radios as old as 30 years […] ‘at the tactical level, the Chechens had better communications than the Russians.’”

Have better radios than your opponents. Russian radios were old and lacked the modern refinements and capabilities that modern radios had. If your enemy is using Baofengs, you better not be using toy store children’s walkie-talkies.

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About the Author: Patriotman

Patriotman currently ekes out a survivalist lifestyle in a suburban northeastern state as best as he can. He has varied experience in political science, public policy, biological sciences, and higher education. Proudly Catholic and an Eagle Scout, he has no military experience and thus offers a relatable perspective for the average suburban prepper who is preparing for troubled times on the horizon with less than ideal teams and in less than ideal locations. Brushbeater Store Page: http://bit.ly/BrushbeaterStore

3 Comments

  1. Steiner Is Real October 12, 2022 at 10:08

    Sporky Time will be very similar with the replacements in the mix who are growing surlier by the day and know that they are here to enjoy the free country given to them by quislings.
    Slide slaps, trash talk, elbowing out of the way, enjoy the inclusion.
    Some good foreign language or code will leave the interlopers busy with some crotch groping.

  2. Greg R October 12, 2022 at 11:47

    It’s 11:59 on Radio Free America; this is Uncle Sam, with music, and the truth until dawn. Right now I’ve got a few words for some of our brothers and sisters in the occupied zone. The chair is against the wall. The chair is against the wall. John has a long mustache. John has a long mustache. It’s twelve o’clock, American, another day closer to victory. And for all of you out there, on, or behind the line, this is your song.

  3. The Old Freedom Fighter October 13, 2022 at 07:46

    Damn good info. Ordering Basic SHTF Radio today. Yes, very important to have good equipment. I have several Yaesu VX-6s, rather pricey but remember the old line, buy a $10 helmet if you have a $10 head. Also, the PREPPCOMM DMX-40 for CW. Also good to have a scanner & even a handheld shortwave receiver like the Alinco DJ-X11. By the way, if someone asks you why you need all this equipment when a cell phone should suffice, just smile & wish them lot’s of luck. They’re going to need it!

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