Partisan Logistics, by Rob

“Before a commander can even start
thinking of maneuvering or giving battle, of marching this
way and that, of penetrating, enveloping, encircling, of
annihilating or wearing down, in short of putting into
practice the whole rigmarole of strategy, he has – or ought –
to make sure of his ability to supply his soldiers with those
3,000 calories a day without which they will very soon cease
to be of any use as soldiers; that roads to carry them to the
right place at the right time are available, and that
movement along these roads will not be impeded by either
a shortage or a superabundance of transport.” Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton

Logistics is the procurement, packaging, transporting, repairing, and disposing of all materials (e.g., food, ammo, equipment, and first aid supplies). Normally, in the preparedness community eyes and minds automatically focus on US military practices and procedures, Army and Marine Corps to be specific. I contend that this is inherently wrong, counter- productive, and leads to failure for the partisan community. However, US military studies regarding logistics, long ignored by most military leaders, may provide the partisan leader with a foundation to build on.

This article outlines how studying force structure availability, hypothetical mission and purpose, and a clear understanding of the community industrial capacity available to the partisan will put a leader back in the position of executing operations with a realistic understanding of the requirements of sustaining a partisan force.

To begin with, partisans need to exam the force structure they have on hand and then determine what kinetic activities (missions, tasks, projects, martial or otherwise) are realistically achievable by the available group. Most American partisan groups at this time, and this is an assumption on my part since there isn’t a directory, are probably not much bigger than a section or platoon in military terms. There are no Partisan Battalions, Brigades or Divisions I have seen or heard of. There are no support personnel assigned and no industrial base oriented specifically to those groups either. Given this, there is nothing to be gained by studying company trains or the practices behind them. This is a simple exercise of how many humans show up and what do they come with. Don’t worry about standardization of gear, common calibers, shoe color, anything. Who and how many showed up. This creates a very important data point going forward. The size of the supported element, the beginning of force structure. This will change but gives the partisan leader a start.

Now comes a study of what those individuals brought with them, in their hands, on their back. Not what’s in their truck or shed or grandma’s house. It won’t count as they can’t readily access it, retrieve it, move it, or use it without ceasing the partisan activity they are needed for or having additional equipment allotted to them. At this point we need to identify what an un-supported partisan element consists of and how long they can sustain their intended activity in a “man portable” or “foot mobile” configuration.

What the partisan leader has now is a preliminary force structure. With this data the leader can make assumptions and plans regarding what the force can be expected to accomplish at that moment. He can quickly determine whether or not they are patrolling over the ridgeline on multiday recon sweeps while sending SPOT reports back to a security element or they’ll be securing the entrance to the housing development while they work on recruitment, training, and equipment procurement. Boring but highly educational and necessary.

The partisan leader established the available force structure and now moves to an in-depth study of what is semi-available to the force. I cannot emphasis “semi-available” enough at this point. If a partisan can walk to his house or truck and lay hands-on food, ammo, water, that’s semi-available. If several partisans are needed to travel to a storage locker with several trucks across town, that’s not semi-available. That becomes a short-term goal or mission, but it is not a resource for planning purposes until in hand. In addition, if two members know a neighbor will stand security if someone looks after his child, that can become semi-available manpower. These activities let the leader know how long his partisan force can function under specific conditions of resupply, mainly self-sustainment at this point until support personnel can be identified, trained, and employed.

Let’s repeat why this is so important: remember, without support personnel a partisan has to stop conducting kinetic activities to resupply. That becomes a large strategic and tactical hurdle for smaller forces or communities that rely on smaller forces as it creates a gap in time when the opposition/risks get to plan and act without partisan input on events. There was a reason for a fighting season before the industrial age. If you didn’t prepare ground and plant crops there wouldn’t be any food for the next year. You can’t eat if you’re fighting and you can’t fight if you aren’t eating.

A leader now has a force structure and an idea of how long that force can last at a foreseeable mission or purpose without additional input.
“5 adult males with AR style rifles, medium size packs with summer bags, 3 out of 5 have line gear, only 3 have basic military training, on hand they have 2 days of food and water. 4 have enough consolidated emergency food to last the group 30 days in their garages ¼ mile down the street”.
Almost too Barney style for many but I would contend this force and its available gear will be different at any given moment of the year, and significantly different after the commencement of any SHTF events, then what partisans may have been training with prior to SHTF. Post-analysis the leader can disavow any plans for hemispheric domination and realistically get down to providing for the needs of community within the constraints of the forces’ capabilities.

The last part of our basic partisan logistics is a review of the capability of the community industrial capacity available to the partisan. That’s a mouthful so let me break it down. What can the local community produce that the partisan needs or could use, when and where are those resources available, and are they available to the partisan group. Remember these are two very different pieces of data and may lead to very different answers. Having a food warehouse in your neighborhood is a huge resource. It means nothing to you if it’s owned by the regional WEF fan club. Having several retirees with large gardens who are sympathetic to your cause may mean less resource abundance but greater availability of those resources. This analysis provides the leader with the data to determine the pace and timing of operations. The specifics are too detailed to delve into in this overview but remember the reason for the “fighting season”

The partisan leader may be thinking “Wow this guy is Captain Obvious”. True the previous guidelines sound simplistic, however, current literature, YouTube, training classes, and Blog writings paint a different picture of current planning and practice. A reassessment of what the force structure actually is, what mission sets can actually be accomplished with the available force structure, and what is actually available to support continued operations becomes absolutely necessary. Some of this can be determined ahead of SHTF but needs to be conducted again as soon as events necessitate action in order to ensure planning matches reality.

In summary, this whole review seems overly simplistic. It should be, it needs to be. This is doctrine. This is the basis for partisan logistics. Everything expanding on this will rely on these simple principles. The partisan will expand on this doctrine by learning how to meet force structure requirements over the necessary time line of mission requirements by leveraging short-term and long-term community industrial capacity with the available community members who cannot or will not engage in kinetic activities. The previous guidelines are doctrine. How to procure available foods/ammo/gear/water, how to store, pack, transport them to the force will be tactics, techniques, and procedures. Subsequent articles will begin to flesh out the realities of those requirements and keep the partisan in a state of operational readiness.