Are Guerrilla Units like Submarines? My Creative Case to Spark Your Thinking, by GuerrillaLogistician

Part One – The RAZORBACK Submarine and the Guerilla Unit: Why are Guerrilla Units and Submarines Similar?

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Reference 1B – The Bridge

“I love my right-wing friends who talk about the tree of liberty is water of the blood of patriots…” “If you need to work about taking on the federal government, you need some F-15s. You don’t need an AR-15.” – President Biden.

Is our President correct?  To some extent, he is; in others, he isn’t, and before we decry President Biden as an idiot and start talking about the trees speaking Vietnamese, we need to look at the facts he is missing.  We will also look at one of my favorite topics that cover most of the things YOU need to look at as a prepper to guerrilla leader.  Logistics!  Before that, and to keep this interesting, let’s compare the G-Unit to submarines to make this interesting.

What many honest but ignorant people on the left don’t get about a simple rifle is similar to Britain’s view during WWI.  You can read the basics about Britain in WWI on the link below, but the lesson learned was this.  The U-boats weren’t as effective when following the prize rules of the day.  The boats had to tell the merchant ships to surrender and give the vessel time to escape before they were sunk.  This gave Britain time to respond to these submarines.  When unrestricted submarine warfare started after the British Q-ships were employed, Britain almost collapsed logistically and nearly lost the war.

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-u-boat-campaign-that-almost-broke-britain

Extraordinary audio of a WWI interview of U-boat engagements.

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/voices-of-the-first-world-war-the-submarine-war

Some weapons platforms can counter others when applied correctly and to the correct target.  Japan, Britain, and even Russia all struggled with the submarine and the effect on logistics.  Some weapons platforms seem awesome and terrifying, and they are.  The Iowa, Yamato, and Bismarck in a standup fight are impressive alone, much less with escorts, and did wipe out lesser opponents.  It took nations coordinating with new tech to deal with some of these ships.  The problem is they also cost a lot and have restraints.  From tanks to battleships, everything in a fight requires something.  We remember battleships and carriers that reigned supreme as figureheads of pinnacle battles.  What gets neglected a lot is the absolute struggle with submarines and destroyer escorts the US, Britain, and Japan dealt with.  These merchants had to feed, fuel, and bring material to these nations to stay in the war.  We forget the signal intelligence used to find merchant ships or hunt subs using loop antennas, radar, and basic sonar.

https://uboat.net/articles/id/51

What does that have to do with a G-Unit, you ask?  There is almost a direct parallel between the war at sea and the G-unit, not only in implementation but in virtually every aspect.  While merchants shipping feared Submarines, warships had far less fear of submarines.  This is also a probable outcome of many G-units vs. mechanized units and fast reaction forces such as the ones employed in Rhodesia.  Let us review some history.

Of the 1,156 German U-boats built, 784 were lost from enemy action or other causes (one sunk from an incident with a toilet).  Germany did lose, but each time the submarine was employed, victory was only accomplished when the U-boats were dealt with.
https://navyhistory.au/british-and-german-submarine-statistics-of-world-war-ii/

[Postwar records compiled by the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee indicate Japan lost 686 warships of 500 gross tons (GRT) or larger, 2,346 merchantmen, and a total of 10.5 million GRT to submarines during 1,600 war patrols. Only 1.6 percent of the total U.S. naval manpower was responsible for America’s success on its Pacific high seas; more than half of the tonnage sunk was credited to U.S. submarines.]

We won against Japan, and while we can’t deny the effects of other ships and battles, logistics were the reason Japan went to war, and US submarines were a massive reason why they lost logistics and the war.

https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/npswapa/extContent/wapa/guides/offensive/sec6.htm#:~:text=Postwar%20records%20compiled%20by%20the,submarines%20during%201%2C600%20war%20patrols

[According to Naval historian Gary E. Weir, “In all, U.S. submarines destroyed 1,314 enemy warships in the Pacific, representing 55% of all Axis power warships lost and a total of 5.3 million tons of shipping.”

The American success came at a cost, though. In World War II, 52 US submarines were lost, with a total of 3,506 officers and enlisted men killed. The US Navy Submarine Service had the highest casualty percentage of any American forces in the War: about 20%.]

https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/submarines-in-world-war-ii.htm#:~:text=In%20World%20War%20II%2C%2052,the%20War%3A%20about%2020%25

What does this mean to a Guerrilla Unit?  Just like the undertrained ships rapidly deployed to the war, G-Units may suffer losses, and this should be expected when the Guerrilla Force is employed improperly or against superior firepower/trained forces.  More can be done as skills increase and knowledge grows, but don’t bite off more than you can chew.

Let’s address the first similarity: submarines and guerilla units often work alone for many reasons.  Sometimes, they are just doing recon; other times, there aren’t enough people to form major fighting forces; other times, it’s safer to be a small and swift unit in areas you know well. It also means they will probably take a higher casualty rate against an organized force. Just like the fleets that protected the battleships, submarines, and guerrilla units are susceptible to those designed to hunt and kill them. With this in mind, we must also focus on what guerrilla units and submarines were most effective against. As most people know, submarines have always been the killer of merchant ships, and while we focus on the German U-boat, the Americans did the same thing against the Japanese. You can also see these actions played out in many insurgencies. For those of you who know the term Jingle truck, you’re probably aware of how often they were shot at when transporting for the US military. While we think of the US military as a fighting force that moves across the terrain, Modern Warfare has become, in many ways, islands with transportation feeding those islands. Mega bases in Afghanistan and Iraq would often transport materials to smaller bases. While critical warfighting materials generally tried to be flown, sustainment supplies frequently traveled by ground.

So, the fragility of the U-boat and the general weakness of initial guerrilla units require them to hunt smaller targets.  As more submarines and experience with tactics and communications came about, submarines began hunting in packs.  This will also be the case with Guerrilla Units as well. People often scoff at the targets of both the submarine and Guerrilla units because of movies and the heroic battles of the past. More often than not, the logistical supplies that feed and maintain a military or opposing force are more critical than the actual fighting men. If a tank runs out of fuel, what good is it? If the unit is low on water and the humidity and heat index make it atrocious, how effective are they? These will also be concerns for any guerrilla unit that falls back onto the submarine. The Germans learned quite quickly that the most susceptible place to destroy their vessels was in port. It was often better, especially during the initial stages of the war, to have the submarines out-engaging targets than being bombed. Guerrilla units as well must also focus on not becoming a target. Although the methods might differ slightly between the vessels and small bands of fighting-age males, the concepts are still very close.

While a guerrilla operation will mainly be done for a limited time, similar requirements present themselves, just like that of a submarine. Let’s look at some of the similarities.

Rations – Submarines and guerrilla units must have sustainable food and water, especially when operating.

Batteries and fuel – These are essential for both the Submarine and the Guerrilla unit.  Both must maintain batteries and fuel to recharge those batteries. This is often overlooked in the prepper community.

Medical – One of the key facets of submarines, and especially early on in the life of a guerrilla unit, is the limited number of personnel. Without replacement personnel, a submarine can’t do its job, nor can a guerrilla unit. Going out with two few people to do the minimum required tasks, we’ll get a submarine sunk and a unit killed. Not only should you have the medical materials needed for long-term illnesses and common plagues of the third world, but you should also have somebody knowledgeable enough to administer the remedies.  Lastly, you need to know what steps you should take to prevent common issues.

Liquoredrabbit does a great job on this topic along with MechMedic, so keep an eye out for them.

Pt 1 – Field Hygiene
https://www.americanpartisan.org/2023/08/why-should-i-care-about-field-hygiene-and-sanitation-part-one-by-liquoredrabbit/

Pt 2 – Field Hygiene
https://www.americanpartisan.org/2023/08/wash-your-damn-hands-field-hygiene-and-sanitation-part-two-by-liquoredrabbit/

Sonar ECM – While guerrilla units may not carry an underwater listening device, they have another equally important spectrum. Scanners and the tiny SA ultra allow guerrilla units visibility into an unseen world.

https://www.americanpartisan.org/2023/07/tinysa-ultra-sigint-setup-by-guerrillalogistician/

Visual technologies – Just like the modern submarine, guerrilla units should also employ technologies and help them see better. This may be simple binoculars, night vision, and thermal devices. While it is possible to work around some of these technologies, and everyone in your unit doesn’t need to have these, they are as much a force multiplier to the submarine force as to a guerrilla unit.

Communication – This is probably a guerrilla unit’s more important and downright misunderstood thing. If people thought about communications more like a submarine and less like some tactical satellite phone-wearing operator off TV, they would be in a much better place. Just like submarines, communication should be done rarely and for purpose only. Not only that, but things like one-time pads are also as crucial to the guerrilla unit as they are to submarines. A particular focus in submarines is ensuring the enemy never gets a hold of encryption devices or comms equipment. Realistically, you will be running COT radios, meaning the frequencies and settings are more important than the radio.

HF Radio
https://www.americanpartisan.org/2023/08/xiegu-g90-the-toyota-hilux-of-radios-by-guerrillalogistician/

A potentially Unbreakable Enigma machine
https://www.americanpartisan.org/2023/06/the-alternative-to-rolling-dice-for-otp-pads-the-adl-1-otp-generator-by-guerrillalogistician/

Cross-training all personnel should be done not only in submarines, which is a hallmark of most submariners’ careers. If I remember correctly, some submariners get their dolphins when they can do almost every job on the submarine, even if their primary skill set is sonar. Likewise, the guerrilla unit, over time, should be learning every aspect of each other‘s job to the best of their ability. Unlike militaries, guerrilla units should initially focus on getting capable people, because trainers, and training time will be scarce. The US military does not allow people under a certain IQ in because they cannot do specific tasks, which you should also look out for.

If things heat up and regular forces begin to fight, this does not diminish or exclude the guerrilla units’ operation. If those forces are intelligent, they will come in contact with guerrilla units either by special forces or some liaison. The guerrilla unit may not even have to fight the enemy directly but become the eyes and ears of stronger forces. Your forces may be the only ones in the battle, but that doesn’t mean reconnaissance is out the window.

Last but not least, I strongly advise you to realize that submarines and guerrilla forces are voluntary. Irregular missions such as these can be taxing and not for everyone. Not only that, but people conscripted into such things or the use of peer pressure will not only turn you in faster but be a detriment to the operation in general. Those who come with you must have the drive to be there.