Not a World War But a World at War

Original article here.

Just in the past 24 months, an astonishing number of armed conflicts have started, renewed, or escalated. Some had been fully frozen, meaning that the sides had not sustained direct combat in years; others were long simmering, meaning that low-level fighting would intermittently erupt. All have now become active.

The list encompasses not just the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, but hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, Serbian military measures against Kosovo, fighting in Eastern Congo, complete turmoil in Sudan since April, and a fragile cease-fire in Tigray that Ethiopia seems poised to break at any time. Syria and Yemen have not exactly been quiet during this period, and gangs and cartels continuously menace governments, including those in Haiti and Mexico. All of this comes on top of the prospect of a major war breaking out in East Asia, such as by China invading the island of Taiwan.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, which has been tracking wars globally since 1945, identified 2022 and 2023 as the most conflictual years in the world since the end of the Cold War. Back in January 2023, before many of the above conflicts erupted, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed sounded the alarm, noting that peace “is now under grave threat” across the globe. The seeming cascade of conflict gives rise to one obvious question: Why?

Three theories can plausibly explain the phenomenon, and whichever one of them is right—or even if all of them are contributing—their upshot suggests that conflicts will likely continue proliferating for some time to come.

The first explanation holds that the cascade is in the eye of the beholder. People are too easily “fooled by randomness,” the essayist and statistician Nassim Nicholas Taleb admonished in his 2001 book of the same title, seeking intentional explanations for what may be coincidence. The flurry of armed confrontations could be just such a phenomenon, concealing no deeper meaning: Some of the frozen conflicts, for instance, were due for flare-ups or had gone quiet only recently. Today’s volume of wars, in other words, should be viewed as little more than a series of unfortunate events that could recur or worsen at any time.

Though this theory may be reasonable, it is not reassuring, nor does it help predict when conflicts will arise or how large they will eventually become.

Although coincidences certainly do occur, the current onslaught happens to be taking place at a time of big changes in the international system. The era of Pax Americana appears to be over, and the United States is no longer poised to police the world. Not that Pax America was necessarily so peaceful. The 1990s were especially disputatious; civil wars arose on multiple continents, as did major wars in Europe and Africa. But the United States attempted to solve and contain many potential conflicts: Washington led a coalition to oust Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from Kuwait, facilitated the Oslo Process to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fostered improved relations between North and South Korea, and encouraged the growth of peacekeeping operations around the globe. Even following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the invasion of Afghanistan was supported by many in the international community as necessary to remove a pariah regime and enable a long-troubled nation to rebuild. War was not over, but humanity seemed closer than ever to finding a formula for lasting peace.

Over the subsequent decades, the United States seemed to fritter away both the goodwill needed to support such efforts and the means to carry them out. By the early 2010s, the United States was bogged down in two losing wars and recovering from a financial crisis. The world, too, had changed, with power ebbing from Washington’s singular pole to multiple emerging powers. As then–Secretary of State John Kerry remarked in a 2013 interview in The Atlantic, “We live in a world more like the 18th and 19th centuries.” And a multipolar world, where several great powers jostle for advantage on the global stage, harbors the potential for more conflicts, large and small.

Specifically, China has emerged as a great power seeking to influence the international system, whether by leveraging the economic allure of its Belt and Road Initiative or by militarily revising the status quo within its region. Russia does not have China’s economic muscle, but it, too, seeks to dominate its region, establish itself as an influential global player, and revise the international order. Whether Russia or China is yet on an economic or military par with the United States hardly matters. Both are strong enough to challenge the U.S.-led international order by leveraging the revisionist sentiment they share with countries throughout the global South.

Great-power competition can be a recipe for disorder. As Hanna Notte and Michael Kimmage recently observed in Foreign Affairs, great powers consumed with the need to variously vie and collude with one another are often too distracted to respond when “midsize powers, small powers, and even nonstate actors collide.” The result is that even if the great powers avoid war with one another, their actions can foment war elsewhere.

Multipolarity isn’t the only systemic change preceding the present wave of conflicts. But the others, including climate change and the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, seem to point back toward multipolarity, if not as a cause, as a factor in the ineffectuality of the global response, and therefore the spiral toward more conflict. Global problems require cooperative solutions, but cooperation can be in short supply when the great powers are motivated to compete and deny, rather than collaborate and share.

Suppose, though, that the proliferation of wars doesn’t have a systemic cause, but an entirely particular one. That the world owes its present state of unrest directly to Russia—and, even more specifically, to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022 and its decision to continue fighting since.

The war in Ukraine, the largest war in Europe since World War II and one poised to continue well past 2024, is absorbing the attention of international actors who otherwise would have been well positioned to prevent any of the abovementioned crises from escalating. This case is not the same as the great-power distraction, in which the world’s most powerful states simply fail to focus on emerging crises. Rather, the great powers lack the diplomatic and military capacity to respond to conflicts beyond Ukraine—and other actors know it.

Consider the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan anticipated that Russia would be unable or unwilling to respond if it moved forces into the Nagorno-Karabakh region and reset the territorial status quo with Armenia. That gamble proved correct. Though Russia played a role in helping to end previous conflicts between the two countries, Moscow has not responded to Azerbaijan’s recent actions against its longtime ally Armenia. The strongest statement from Russia came from Vladimir Putin himself, who only quipped, “If Armenia itself recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, what do we have to do with it?”

Consider also the war in Gaza. With the major powers focusing their diplomatic and military resources on Ukraine, Hamas judged the international environment opportune for striking Israel. The deputy head of Hamas, Saleh al-Arouri, was explicit on this point back in April, telling Al Jazeera: “Sensing the importance of the current battle with Russia over global influence, the United States places a priority on preventing the outbreak of other conflicts and maintaining global calm and stability until the end of the Ukraine battle … Our responsibility is to take advantage of this opportunity and escalate our resistance in a real and dangerous way that threatens the calm and stability they want.”

These three explanations—coincidence, multipolarity, Russia’s war in Ukraine—are not mutually exclusive. If anything, they are interrelated, as wars are complex events; the decline of U.S. hegemony contributes to growing multipolarity; and great-power competition has surely fed Russia’s aggression and the West’s response. The consequence is that others are caught in the great-power cross fire or will seek to start fires of their own. Even if none of these wars rise to the level of a third world war, they will be devastating all the same. We do not need to be in a world war to be in a world at war.

Wars were already a persistent feature of the international system. But they were not widespread. War was always happening somewhere, in other words, but war was not happening everywhere. The above dynamics could change that tendency. The prevalence of war, not just its persistence, could now be our future.