Bad Logistics – When Mobile Warfare Can Hurt Capability, by GuerrillaLogistician

By Glogistician @glogistician on X.com
Reference – 18G

You sit in the woods with your rifle and a few friends, panting from the exertion of running for so long. As you sit and think about the world that was, ponder how much you would enjoy having all the little creature comforts you cherished and the lack of supplies you have now.  Some that were vital to staying alive and you hadn’t stockpiled.  You realize how screwed you are and put your face down into your hands as you sit on a fallen tree. How had this all gone wrong, you thought, as you sat, the smell of gasoline in the air almost making your eyes water, or were those tears of frustration?  Your little partisans were exhausted from all the movement on foot, lack of food, and everything was overwhelming you.

You were confident and ready to fight when everything popped off a week ago. You thought you had more ammo than you knew what to do with, and with A couple of MRE cases and vehicles, you thought you’d be the badass of the region. Why hold back ample supplies when you could get supplies from the enemy? That was why you stockpiled so many weapons and had so much ammo on hand.  All those MREs you had stripped down and taped up jammed in your backpacks, the amount of effort you took to be ready for any fight, but what you hadn’t realized was the fact that within 2 months of the grocery stores being almost bare, and one short week of actual conflict, you would turn from a partisan to just a Raider hungry and tired. Instead of setting up your community to work together, as Joe Dolio, Clay Martin, and many others had advised, some of your friends decided to uproot from your location and operate from the woods.  None of you had stepped off before the shooting started because you planned to be mobile instead of fixed to one location. You figured it would be easier to throw everything in the back of trucks, disappear up into the hills, and strike any enemy from the confines of the woods. You thought you had all the supplies you needed to survive in the woods, hunt trap, and fish.  The forest in your area had tons of food, at least you thought so.  As the initial shots were reported from the mob of angry city dwellers, you weren’t there to protect your community.  You had moved with all the supplies you could take with your friends up into the nearby hills you knew so well.  Now, the woods were teaming with people desperate to eat, and you were one of several such groups hunting the place clean and picking every wild edible from the earth.

As things escalated and your guys moved further in the woods away from your home, resupplying them was almost impossible. Without the network of people that would have deflected or even stopped the invasion, all the gas stations, grocery stores, and auto shops were now either plucked clean or burned to the ground. After the first few days, one of your trucks broke down; you used the other truck to slide into town at night and realized the devastation.  Bright green stars floated to the heavens like little prayers for help from the piles of burned material, still smoldering through your night vision as your group saw what the destruction of an unopposed mob could do. When the small group left town, they took fire, puncturing a rear tire. Unfortunately, both vehicles were incompatible when it came to tires, so you were down your spare, which had been dry-rotted for years. That tire had torn apart, but without a patch kit or the simple ability to get rubber cement, all you had was a rim. After a little while, you decided to stuff the old tire full of leaves, which worked, but handling had suffered some. With only one functional vehicle, when the enemy started moving towards your location, you had to triage the supplies you had left versus the people you needed to move.

Quickly, your team tried to bury as much of the spare ammo as you could to make room for the food that was in more desperate supply every day. At this point, you thought you would be raiding enemy convoys, but most of these people coming at you had nothing beyond weapons and starving bellies. Meanwhile, you didn’t have much time to go hunting, and whenever you got within sight of an animal, someone else in the hills would take a shot and scare off your prey. When you finally caught a hostile vehicle, the enemy combatants were loaded much like you guys had been, except they had the three downward arrows inside a circle spray-painted black on the side of their truck. You got into a hasty ambush and decimated them. Quickly moving up, you scavenged what you could, but your team had shot the vehicle so full of holes and burned through quite a bit of ammo that the meager return in supplies almost wasn’t worth the ambush. While one of your team members was trying to figure out if there were any parts you could scrounge off this vehicle and mate to your other disabled vehicle, two more vehicles came roaring up the dirt Road.  Racing with the gear you had into the woods, you hurriedly bounded to cover, hoping you weren’t seen.

The next day, with all the fuel supplies from your small town being fed into these marauding urban dwellers, the woods were more alive with vehicles, unlike what you heard before everything went to hell. The only thing that kept you safe was that you knew little trails that were hard to spot and locations that weren’t on any maps, and only locals knew. Even with all this knowledge, as you guys lay in nice tents and warm sleeping bags on the fifth night, the cracking and smashing of twigs could be heard in the woods. Everyone quietly got to their guns and slowly unzipped their tents, moving out to locations around your hidden little refuge. Two of your men could see six guys traipsing through the woods just below the ridgeline where you set up, even hearing their conversation as they watched another group of IR lights through their night vision several hundred yards further away. The men below were talking about the smell of food and wood fire, sounding almost ravenous as their minds focused on the food you had cooked no more than an hour and a half ago. Even though the fire was out, you were sure the traces of campfire still lingered in the air ever so slightly from small coals quietly burning in the ash. Usually, you would have thoroughly put out the fire, but with how difficult it was now to get water to your location, no one wished to spare what precious amount they had to smother the fire truly.  Normally, your crew had camped near rivers and bodies of water, but these days, it looked like the whole town and the mob had moved to those locations.  This made water for your group challenging to procure, and it was apparent that even though the urban mob couldn’t stalk through the woods, their numbers made up for their lack of skill.

Today was the 6th day, and your last running vehicle, having been run through rough terrain one too many times and moved by people not used to driving vehicles in the woods, had backed over a sapling and punctured a hole in the gas tank. At this point, you were running on what limited equipment you had on your body and the caches you hoped nobody would find in reserve. Sitting there depressed, you knew that you had guided your people into an unwinnable position or supplies would become so short you would become raiders yourself.  The enemy was raiding you more than you were them, and former neighbors had better setups than you did. What were you supposed to do when the enemy had nothing, you almost had nothing, and in a week’s time, you would have to be just like the people you opposed? You couldn’t possibly keep your people alive, fed, and clean this way, and you knew if this was how things were going to go, you would either have to take a cachet for yourself and your family or take from others. Where was the relief? Wasn’t there ample supplies to feed the enemy as well? Didn’t that enemy have a plan for all this, or were they just as screwed as you were? In the end, you didn’t know what you would do, so you just sat there.

Even with all the military manuals produced, there is very little information about guerrilla fighters and their logistical trains. I’ve yet to read every book on the subject, and some of those cost over $100 due to their limited supply, and even more shockingly, the open-source materials from the US military are rather limited as well. My assumption, which may be far off the mark, is that much of this logistical knowledge is ignored for more interesting topics, and a lot of the logistics with partisan fighters either started from homegrown groups that stockpiled over time or had been piecemeal together through black markets and things of other dubious nature. If this is the case, much of this probably wasn’t written down for the security of the operations during the initial and mid stages of the partisan movement.

Several nations now that are going through internal conflict show photos of soldiers with homemade 3D-printed weapons, and some are requesting money through various means. Still, you will seldom see what they require in supplies.  They don’t talk about how few bullets they have, etc.  It appears that most of the logistical knowledge that we acquire tends to be near the late stages of any conflict of this kind. Even so, we can look at the Ukrainian-Russian war and see a lot of their logistical needs, but even so, the minutiae of fuel and subsistence materials is generally ignored by OSINT nerds on YouTube. You often see requests without a specified number when it comes to these particular things, as they always seem to be in short supply. Indeed, this gives you an inferior view of logistics during the initial phases of any partisan operation. Many of the best and brightest that have written about this topic have been the socialists, and even they tend not to give as much detail as one would want.

Charlie Wilson’s War is a good book that references some of the mismanagement of materials sent by the US, but it doesn’t dive very deeply into it.  Gust Avrakotos and others like Mike Vickers pushed for a mixture of weapons platforms instead of a uniform supply of the Lee Enfield in .303 and a huge increase in ammunition. Let’s look at what Vickers explained to Avrakotos on ammo alone, which changed the funding the US put into the conflict, which had originally started at 30 million dollars. Initially, they had been buying Lee Enfield rifles and the .303 cartridge, which had gone up from three cents during the initial phases to almost $0.12. Now, they were transferring AK-47s to the conflict, which could easily consume 200 rounds in a firefight. With 10 firefights in a month, that would be 2000 rounds of ammunition, and given the annual fighting season of three to four months, one mujahedeen would require about 7000 rounds of ammunition. This meant the simple Rifleman would need a $165 AK-47 and just over $1000 in ammo.

To keep 100,000 men at war would cost the US government over $100 million. This doesn’t include Vickers’s requirements to have a diversified weapons complement, much like the green berets.  The diversity in weapons platforms increased fighting capabilities over simple rifles, which included weapons similar to the 50 Cal and M240 machine guns, which ultimately led to stingers ending up in Afghanistan. With all that said, think about the amount of money that would cost today and all the other supplies like medical and subsistence equipment needed to fight. Without an outside entity bringing you supplies, how long will your fight be, and even if they Provide you ammunition, will they be capable of supplying any other needs such as food and medication? Why is this important well NCScout has pointed this out over and over, Venezula the AK-103 production by Russia.  The plant was designed to produce 25,000 rifles and 60 million rounds a year.

https://www.americanpartisan.org/2018/07/venezuelas-kalashnikov-factory-to-be-at-full-capacity-in-2019/

https://www.defense-aerospace.com/russia-to-open-kalashnikov-ak-103-production-plant-in-venezuela/

https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-WP7-Surplus-Arms-in-South-America.pdf

There are only three pipelines of supplies coming into any insurgency, revolution, or whatever you have.  No matter who you are or what your cause is, regardless if it is for a socialist revolution or anti-communist actions, war has always been a consumption of commodities. The only thing active conflict produces is the loss of human life and the destruction of the status quo. You are trading materials for political/social energy when you go to war, whether large-scale world wars or low-intensity conflicts.  So, where do you get the fuel to drive a conflict? Che Guevera briefly explains what a universal truth is in his book on guerrilla warfare. Initially, all supplies for the conflict must come from the local forces; he states that the supplies must come from internal sources during the first stages of the conflict, which isn’t always true but is generally the rule instead of the exception. He also talks about supplies from supporters within the area and understands that those supporters must maintain their daily lives to facilitate any supplies procured for the resistance. What he means is that these supplies are either local or prepositioned, and that has held with almost all logistical support from any insurgency operation curated by western or eastern nations. This is also the reason why the Second Amendment is so important to the US and addressing overreach with the US government; the US government has to abide by the people’s will because we are already pre-positioned with supplies and arms, unlike many other nations that have had an uphill struggle to get out of corrupt governments control.

Not to dive too deeply into the politics of things, which is left for more competent people than me to discuss. I want you to bear in mind how essential pre-positioning supplies are. No one can even engage in any opposition beyond words without these pre-positioned supplies. This dives into another topic: how much to have stockpiled away, avenues of resupply, and ultimately, the social and political sway necessary to get support for such supplies. The French backed the young American nation over the British for no reason other than to hurt British rule. Foreign governments weren’t supplying Afghanistan at nearly the level seen during our occupation compared to before our invasion.  Many nations, NGOs, and religious groups funneled money and supplies into the conflict purely to attack the US via a proxy.

Donbas, Ukraina, 25.08.2022. Na zdjêciach z 19 bm. rosyjska broñ zdobyta przez wojsko ukraiñskie na linii frontu w regionie Donbasu. Trwa inwazja Rosji na Ukrainê. (sko) PAP/Vladyslav Karpovych

Your next avenue of supplies comes from captured supplies. This requires an act of force to go in and take those supplies or have sympathetic parties inside of the opposition forces who are willing to supply you. This becomes far more difficult when you have fewer supplies than you need; the enemy is well versed in defending their supplies and has a military force and people backing them. Even with reasonable intelligence and strong people, such operations generally come with casualties and may cost more lives than the reward of the supplies you gather. Likewise, anyone who knows about such things also knows that a QRF tends not to be far away from stockpiles and convoys.

Convoys are the weakest link in any supply chain, as you can only roll so many weapons and supplies while also having to use supplies such as fuel, food, and water both ways. Even if there is no conflict, class I subsistence and class III Petroleum, oils, and lubricants are some of the supplies in the highest demand by any organized fighting force.  Knowing what is moving and what you need is extremely important, more than just striking a convoy to see what you can take. Supplies requiring liquid containment, such as buffaloes and fuel trucks, are worthless if you can’t take them away or store them safely. Unlike the military, irregular forces don’t consistently have the same demands as larger fighting forces. Still, the militaries have these supplies on tap for a reason.

For the military, a broken part on a vehicle is simple, or a broken part on your truck may be almost impossible to get a hold of, depending on the vehicle. This means partisan forces must adapt and deal with logistics far differently than most militaries until your third phase.  It is also worth noting that some of the military’s supplies may not be necessary for your partisans because they may have already stockpiled these items. Still, no partisan fighting force survives by their wit and skill alone and must rely on an intelligence network of locals who support their cause. Sometimes, striking a convoy and quietly releasing all the petroleum to the locals for a minor fee or free could substantially bolster your reputation. There is a reason why Robin Hood isn’t a socialist propaganda story but more of a story about guerrilla warfare against a repressive and illegitimate government.  This is also why Che Guevera made medical care for locals a priority, which was in high demand and short supply from the ruling government.  Once the conflict begins, it is worth noting supply issues for your forces and the populace as a whole.

The third phase of logistical insurgency comes from external sources. This can be anything from foreign nations, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), or even grassroots in other locations supplying you either by financial donation or black market supply of materials. This is everything from airdropping supplies to the Irish gun running from America into the troubles with the UK and Ireland. This may not be as substantial as what an army would see being supplied. However, this is where you get more of a military supply chain, which generally comes in a conflict’s middle or end phases.  A more recent example would be the current conflict with Israel and Palestine. The US government is playing both sides by not only supplying Israel with funding and weapons but also making airdrops of food for the Palestinians, which relieves the stress of subsistence for both innocent victims and the fighters who are probably taking those supplies as well. However, it seems that the Palestinians are less than grateful and know precisely what The US government is doing.

The partisan needs to closely monitor subsistence ammunition and medical items initially and throughout the conflict. This would be class I, V, and VIII in military speak.  Equipment like civil supplies, petroleum, construction materials, and repair parts become more important later as things progress and partisan groups grow. This would be classed X, III, IV, and IX.  While in the field operations, we track logistics with the BRAG method (Black Red Amber Green); partisans will have a more challenging time using this as a standard for resupply when they come back to base.  It is still useful to the partisan in the field, just less useful to transmit back to a base, which might require more detailed numbers.  This is where LGOP (Little Group Of Partisans) Transitions to LOGOP (Lots Of Groups Of Partisans).  As the LGOP uses local and captured supplies when the numbers increase to LOGOP, the captured and external sources must be managed more closely. Tracking your logistics should be held as one of your higher priorities, and it is recommended that you look at your supplies in terms of how many conflicts you can engage in with a specific amount of partisans. Your supplies may only last you one engagement with the platoon-sized element, while you might get a few engagements with the squad size. As numbers of people increase, spoilage occurs in higher numbers. Six guys can keep track of 1000 rounds far more easily than thirty guys can keep track of 10,000 rounds. Each bullet dropped each time becomes drops in a bucket that fills rapidly as more people are involved.

Another major issue that you have comes from the weight and the packaging of supplies. There is never a good way to package everything you want. Generally speaking, whether by man, animal, or vehicle, you will always run out of weight capacity long before you run out of dimensional overload called cubing out. This means the back of your truck may be able to carry a ton of bullets, but the suspension wear and ability to carry supplies may be impossible. Adage two is one, and one is none, which is common in the prepper community, but when you start carrying two weapons, two radios, and two sleeping bags, you realize the weight picks up quickly. However, you can cube out on two military sleeping bags reasonably quickly.

Let’s remember water, where one gallon of water isn’t substantially large and can fit along your back in a bladder, while the added 8 lbs of water on a heavy bag could be more of an issue than a benefit.  Being a partisan means you don’t always have to carry everything that you fight with, and even though you don’t have the supply tail of a modern military force, you have a lot more flexibility in the regions you can reach either by foot or by vehicle. What takes the military organization hours to plan is the time they used to set up, and the time to execute may only require hours to plan and then execute. The modern soldier will be carrying a hell of a lot more supplies than you will; much like The US and Afghanistan had soldiers with eight to 12 magazines riding around in armored vehicles, the local fighters generally carried no more than a handful of magazines, maybe a canteen of water and a weapon. This meant they could shoot and scoot far faster than the US military forces could chase. The US military began relying heavily on technology to bridge the gap in reaction time, and our military forces were highly motivated and trained in reaction. Not all of these reactions were fast enough to catch all of the attackers all of the time.

Overall, when looking at the logistics of a partisan force, you must realize that survival means most likely keeping a day job so you can supply yourself with many of the materials you need to survive, unlike a fighting force provided by a government. This means the survival aspects we’re used to thinking about may get skewed oddly. The rule of threes, while important, does not become an unnecessary issue for local partisans. You won’t have to own a tent or a sleeping bag technically; you may want some food to bring along, but if your engagement is local and you are not traveling long distances, you should be more concerned with keeping yourself fed daily than in the field. The reason why subsistence is part of the primary concern is that it is usually one of the main attacks against areas with an insurgency that are easily exploited, especially in communist lead countries.  The military currently works with the acronym SWEATIR, while Brushbeater teaches a better SWEATMC Variation that is a little older. (https://www.americanpartisan.org/2023/09/run-silent-run-deep-the-insurgency-primer-to-submerging-under-your-enemy-by-guerrillalogistician/ )

Is your sustainment going to be the things that people attack because you are the local partisan, and your sustainment will be not only the food you eat but the electricity to run the tools at home to cook your food and the sewer system you may or may not be able to use. Sometimes, the logistics you need to deal with in a partisan format may be helping someone install a septic system for a group of locals who no longer have running water and sewage. Liquored Rabbit has talked about this already, and I think it’s one of the features in your logistical mindset that needs to change from that of a military organization. In theory, you won’t need shelter because you are working around multiple areas of shelter that are far superior to a tent. As a person preparing for the worst, you might want to own one. It may not be something that the partisan logs in their logistical train or is required from an outside source over other more important things like medical supplies. The unfortunate thing is that preppers overlap with partisans in thinking. Still, the priorities of surviving a disaster do not always constitute that of someone trying to fight off an invasion of ideology or foreign actors.  This is why I won’t tell you to read specific military books on logistics, and I will send you to the socialists who have written on the same topic because many of them have started as grassroots organizations. Sadly, it produced a better understanding of the situation, even if it is smeared in their political beliefs.

I want to conclude that mobility is also very important for you to look at as a partisan, but strictly focusing on it as an initial reaction or diving into that world because of a military background might hurt your cause more than help it. There is nothing wrong with having several Toyota Hilux trucks running around the woods, but you must know what supplies you need to survive and sustain warfare. Much like the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, they generally fight seasonally and farm the rest of the time, and this may be a situation where you will be if the US devolves like so many think it will. That means that if you flex from your local areas, you may be killing yourself far faster than the enemy could kill you. There is a balancing act in every situation, and your situation is going to be different from people you know even a town away, but realistically, the partisan has an effect on a geographical location more than it does a mobile capacity to fight. For those of you in urban environments, I suggest you look at Clay Martin’s book Concrete Jungle and remember, just like the story, going to the woods may not be possible. Even if you have like-minded people in an area you wish to travel to, that doesn’t mean they’ll accept you, primarily if you can’t provide anything. We all can’t move to rural areas and make a living, nor do insurgencies require everyone to move out of the cities for their safety; several notable insurgents have also written on this subject. Just know that your mobility needs to be pre-planned, and you must work within the confines of reality. The idea of sneaking off into the woods and fighting from the hills waxes poetic, but rarely is it easy, as can be read about by numerous insurgencies from communists to contras.