As excerpted from this link. The political compliance officers are coming next, run through the new ‘insider threat awareness’ program detailed below. This is going to turn into a purge of the armed forces, welcome to communism, America. You’re about to get your ass kicked by Russia and China. -NCS

Since his appointment, Secretary Austin has issued two memoranda to guide the Department’s
response to the threat posed by extremist activity. The first directed a Department wide “stand
down” to educate personnel across the Total Force, and the second directed a set of immediate
actions and the establishment of the CEAWG.

On February 5, 2021, Secretary Austin released a memorandum entitled StandDown to
Address Extremism in the Ranks.” It outlined the importance of the constitutionally required
oath of office for all members of the Total Force and underscored the incompatibility of
extremist activities with that oath. The memorandum also directed commanding officers and
supervisors across the Total Force within sixty days to conduct a oneday “standdown,” using
the Department of Defense instruction that describes prohibited extremist activities (DoDI
1325.06) as a guiding document for “standdown” discussions. Secretary Austin directed these
discussions to include “the importance of our oath of office; a description of impermissible
behaviors; and procedures for reporting suspected, or actual, extremist behaviors in accordance
with the DoDI. Secretary Austin also directed leaders to listen to the “concerns, experiences,
and possible solutions” from the workforce during these discussions.

On April 9, 2021, Secretary Austin released a memorandum which directed a series of immediate
actions and the establishment of a crossfunctional working group (the CEAWG) to oversee the
implementation of the immediate actions and the formulation of additional midterm and long
term recommendations. The immediate actions directed by Secretary Austin included:

  • Review and update DoDI 1325.06 to clarify the definition of prohibited extremist activity
  • Review and standardize accession questionnaires
  • Update the Service member transition checklist
  • Commission an outside study on extremist activity in the Total Force

DoDI 1325.06 (Excerpt)
(1) Extremist Activities. The term “extremist activities” means:

(a) Advocating or engaging in unlawful force, unlawful violence, or other illegal means
to deprive individuals of their rights under the United States Constitution or the laws of the United
States, including those of any State, Commonwealth, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or any
political subdivision thereof.

(b) Advocating or engaging in unlawful force or violence to achieve goals that are
political, religious, discriminatory, or ideological in nature.

(c) Advocating, engaging in, or supporting terrorism, within the United States or abroad.

(d) Advocating, engaging in, or supporting the overthrow of the government of the
United States, or any political subdivision thereof, including that of any State, Commonwealth,
Territory, or the District of Columbia, by force or violence; or seeking to alter the form of these
governments by unconstitutional or other unlawful means (e.g., sedition).

(e) Advocating or encouraging military, civilian, or contractor personnel within the DoD
or United States Coast Guard to violate the laws of the United States, or any political subdivision
thereof, including those of any State, Commonwealth, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or to
disobey lawful orders or regulations, for the purpose of disrupting military activities (e,g.,
subversion), or personally undertaking the same.

(f) Advocating widespread unlawful discrimination based on race, color, national origin,
religion, sex (including pregnancy), gender identity, or sexual orientation.

(2) Active Participation. For purposes of this section, the term “active participation” means
the following, except where such activity is within the scope of an official duty (e.g., intelligence or
law enforcement operations):

(a) Advocating or engaging in the use or threat of unlawful force or violence in support
of extremist activities.

(b) Advocating for, or providing material support or resources to, individuals or
organizations that promote or threaten the unlawful use of force or violence in support of extremist
activities, with the intent to support such promotion or threats.

(c) Knowingly communicating information that compromises the operational security of
any military organization or mission, in support of extremist activities.

(d) Recruiting or training others to engage in extremist activities.

(e) Fundraising for, or making personal contributions through donations of any kind
(including but not limited to the solicitation, collection, or payment of fees or dues) to, a group or
organization that engages in extremist activities, with the intent to support those activities.

(f) Creating, organizing, or taking a leadership role in a group or organization that
engages in or advocates for extremist activities, with knowledge of those activities.

(g) Actively demonstrating or rallying in support of extremist activities (but not merely
observing such demonstrations or rallies as a spectator).

(h) Attending a meeting or activity with the knowledge that the meeting or activity
involves extremist activities, with the intent to support those activities:

(1) When the nature of the meeting or activity constitutes a breach of law and order;

(2) When a reasonable person would determine the meeting or activity is likely to
result in violence; or

(3) In violation of offlimits sanctions or other lawful orders.

(i) Distributing literature or other promotional materials, on or off a military installation,
the primary purpose and content of which is to advocate for extremist activities, with the intent to
promote that advocacy.

(j) Knowingly receiving material support or resources from a person or organization that
advocates or actively participates in extremist activities with the intent to use the material support or
resources in support of extremist activities.

(k) When using a government communications system and with the intent to support
extremist activities, knowingly accessing internet web sites or other materials that promote or
advocate extremist activities.

(l) Knowingly displaying paraphernalia, words, or symbols in support of extremist
activities or in support of groups or organizations that support extremist activities, such as flags,
clothing, tattoos, and bumper stickers, whether on or off a military installation.

(m) Engage in electronic and cyber activities regarding extremist activities, or groups that
support extremist activities including posting, liking, sharing, retweeting, or otherwise distributing
content when such action is taken with the intent to promote or otherwise endorse extremist
activities. Military personnel are responsible for the content they publish on all personal and public
Internet domains, including social media sites, blogs, websites, and applications.

(n) Knowingly taking any other action in support of, or engaging in, extremist activities,
when such conduct is prejudicial to good order and discipline or is servicediscrediting.
The CEAWG also provided recommendations in the areas of Military Justice and Policy, the
Insider Threat Program, Investigative Processes and Screening Capabilities, and Education and
Training. USD(P&R) and USD(I&S) will oversee the implementation of the following
initiatives and associated actions with quarterly reports to the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
through the Deputy’s Workforce Council (DWC).

1. Identify funding required for key areas related to insiderthreat (InT) analysis and
response, including:

(1.1) A centralized Prevention, Assistance, and Response (PAR) capability that
standardizes implementation of Insider Threat program requirements and reduces DoD
Component concerns about organizational responsibilities and resourcing requirements.

(1.2) A centralized Behavioral Threat Analysis Center (BTAC), staffed by behavioral
science and threatassessment/management personnel to support the DoD Insider Threat
(1.3) A robust Defense Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC)
System of Systems capability to enhance casemanagement capabilities and advanced
analytics to identify trends.

(1.4) An Insider Threat Assessment Program through the DITMAC’s Enterprise Program
Management Office (EPMO). New EPMO personnel will evaluate all DoD InT
programs based on appropriate riskmanagement criteria outlined in the “enhanced FOC”

(1.5) A DoD Workforce InT hotline to create a Departmentwide virtual, anonymous
reporting capability, and triage management center.
(1.6) A DoD InT Program funding line for the DoD Insider Threat program.
(1.7) Support of the DoD Inspector General, through the Deputy Inspector General for
Diversity, Inclusion, and Extremism (DIEM), consistent with Section 554 of the FY 2021
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

2. Develop a comprehensive training and education plan that provides regular training to
Department of Defense military and civilian personnel and to those advancing to leadership
positions. The plan will cover factors such as content, periodicity, and modality. At a minimum,
content will be based on the new definition of “extremist activities” and “active participation”
contained in the revised DoDI 1325.06, to include reporting options, and available resources.
This DoDwide training on extremist activity and InT education plan will include:

(2.1) Evaluating and implementing best methods and curriculum for leadership training
on Insider Threat and Prevention, Assistance, and Response (PAR) resources within 240

(2.2) Creating a new annual, standalone, computerbased Joint Force extremist activity
training course for delivery in FY22 based on the revised DoDI 1325.06 definition.

(2.3) Sharing information and best practices on countering extremist activity with
international allies and partners through existing engagements.

(2.4) Developing a combined InT awareness and countering extremist activities training,
and a requirement for the Services to include this training in all levels of Professional
Military Education.

(2.5) Requiring the Services to include inperson discussions about extremist activity in
periodic training addressing unit climate and culture to amplify education efforts, allow
feedback to inform future efforts and understanding, and strengthen organizational
culture and climate.

(2.6) Requiring the Services to develop counterextremist activity training tailored for
Senior Enlisted Leaders (SELs), law enforcement, recruiters, and legal advisors.

3. Review and update relevant policies to provide notice to Total Force personnel
concerning prohibited activities. This will include establishing policy and a definition of
“extremist activity” applicable to DoD civilian employees to be included in DoDI 1438.06,
DoD Workplace Violence Prevention and Response Policy,” within 90 days of the publication
of the revised extremist activities definition in DoDI 1325.06. As the Department develops this
new definition applicable to civilian personnel, it will be aligned as closely as possible to the
revised definition applicable to military personnel.

(3.1) After a definition of prohibited extremist activities for civilian personnel is
established, OUSD(P&R) will reissue DoDI 1438.06, draft or reissue any other relevant

policy, and develop any necessary training materials to establish clear standards for
Department of Defense civilian employees concerning prohibited extremist activity.

(3.2) Examining the possibility of including extremist behavior in the adjudicative criteria
for suitability determinations under DoDI 1400.25 Volume 731, “DoD Civilian
Personnel Management System: Suitability and Fitness Adjudication for Civilian
Employees,” to allow for a civilian employee’s extremist activity to be included as part of
DoD’s determination of their suitability.

(3.3) Utilizing existing forceprotection and basesecurity authorities to address extremist
activities and threats pursuant to DoDI 5200.08, “Security of DoD Installations and
Resources and the DoD Physical Security Review Board, with regard to DoD contractor

(3.4) Utilizing existing contracting officer authorities to ensure compliance with the terms
and conditions of DoD contracts.

(3.5) Designating the USD(I&S) as the OSD PSA proponent for the InT Program’s
Prevention, Assistance, and Response (PAR) policy, integrating it with the larger InT
capability planning and operations, and publishing the PAR implementation policy within
180 days.

(3.6) Evaluating the transition of workplace violence policy to OUSD(I&S), to further
synchronize that policy with the InT program and PAR policies, and implementing the
decision within 180 days.

4. Insider Threat study on information sharing and risk prioritization. This study will:

(4.1) Compare information reported to the DITMAC, and evaluate it against information
reported through personnel security, counterintelligence, and law enforcement channels.

(4.2) Determine whether reported information leads to appropriate responses and
whether relevant information is reaching insiderthreat hubs.

(4.3) Determine whether, and if so, what specific statutory authority may be necessary to
increase both reporting and availability of data to insiderthreat hubs.

(4.4) Assess and recommend any technical capabilities that could assist hubs in
prioritizing work based on risk.

5. Improve and modernize the Insider Threat program to create clear requirements,
improved information review, and enhanced capabilities. This will include:

(5.1) Developing an operation manual that better defines legal requirements and
information sharing between InT elements.

(5.2) Implementing “Enhanced Full Operational Capability” (EFOC) framework
standards under which all DoD InT Programs will operate by October 1, 2022.

(5.3) Updating the policy for the appropriate use of PAEI to support analysis of
concerning activities within 180 days.

6. Develop and initiate execution of an outreach and education plan related to the InT
Program within 90 days.

(6.1) This will include training aids to educate and inform a wide range of audiences
regarding the importance of reporting information pertaining to extremist activities and
other behaviors of insiderrisk concern, as well as what should be reported.